

THE PERSONALIST



A QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
RELIGION AND
LITERATURE



RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING, EDITOR

Assisted by F. C. S. Schiller, R. F. A. Hoernle, W. H. Long
E. D. Starbuck, H. L. Searles, B. A. G. Fuller, H. J. Smith
Richard Hope, William Van Wyck, Edgar S. Brightman
and others

Foreign Advisory Editors: N. Lossky, Prague; Victor Monod,
Strassburg; Mario Puglisi, Rome; Ph. Kohnstamm, Amsterdam;
Henrich Gomperz, Vienna.

LUCY WAITT, *Subscription Secretary*

Published by


THE SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
3551 UNIVERSITY AVENUE - LOS ANGELES - CALIFORNIA

Copyright, R. T. FLEWELLING, 1936
Entered as second-class matter July 3, 1933, at P.O. at L.A. under act of March 3, 1879

Registered U. S. Patent Office

SINGLE COPIES 50 CENTS

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION \$2.00



AMERICAN LAÖCOÖN

¶ Whatever the mythical import or the pedagogical intent of the famous story of the ancient priest and his sons, overwhelmed in the coil of the serpent, it finds ready application to the present American scene, as indeed to complicated modern life everywhere.

¶ We are all of us caught in the unyielding coils of a complex society which puts us under continual constraint.

¶ Governments undertake courses of action that wrong the moral sensibilities of their citizens and compel them to become participants in unwilling turpitude.

¶ The silent, yet no less powerful, influences of society work in the same direction bringing pressure to bear upon the individual who does not conform to customs which fashions of the moment decree.

¶ Independence of activity which is comparatively simple in a cave-age world becomes increasingly difficult with the growing complexities of life.

¶ This leads us to comment by contrast on the sturdy moral independence of former days and to see in any exhibition of stiff-necked and unyielding

expression of moral will the dying flare of "the last Puritan."

¶ In reality, the "first" Puritan found it impossible to conform to the manners of a ruling society and was compelled by force of circumstance to seek the wilds in the interests of a better conscience.

¶ Now that his "wilds" have become the crowded crossways of an overcrowded world, the Puritanic conscience finds itself recaptured to the old social bonds from which it had escaped.

¶ It can no longer flee to the uttermost parts of the earth for refuge.

¶ The result is that society tends to drop to the baseness of its lowest members. The tempo of its movement is no longer set by its strongest, most intelligent, best motivated, but by its weaker, less thinking, and criminal members.

¶ The problem is no longer one of individual salvation. Less and less possible is the intention of living to ourselves alone. Our action touches in some measure the standards and moral outlook of all living men.

¶ The escape to the solitary and dignified moral heights of individual independence is cut off and we survive or perish morally as the crowd survives or perishes.

¶ The point of attack by the moral forces of our time is no longer merely the individual. The snatching of a few choice brands from the burning cannot now meet the moral and social problems of our age.

¶ The demand is for a wide-spread upward movement of the whole mass of society.

¶ We must make a world in which men of moral feeling can live. The new freedom that the times require is not a freedom for the individual to do whatever he pleases. It can only be a freedom to work for the general moral and spiritual welfare.

¶ The change from a simple to a complex and closely-related interlocking world has intensified problems of government, of industry, of morals and of life generally.

¶ Half our difficulties arise out of new conditions coming with the change from farm-life to city life; from hand-labor to machine; from national isolation to a crowded world.

¶ All forces are at work to further complicate the situation. The problems are essentially new because we are living in a new world. The solutions must likewise fit the new conditions.

¶ The great danger lies in stifling the moral consciousness of our best, the delivery of society over to its most selfish and most vicious elements. We have come upon a day made possible by modern invention, when the whole world must rise or fall together.

¶ Can we speed up the spiritual tempo to the new age?

—R. T. F.

The Personalist

THE SOURCE OF EVOLUTION

By THE EDITOR

“**O**UT of the heart are the issues of life.” In this phrase might be summarized the burden of this essay. But these words have seldom been taken seriously and rarely have they been given the scientific interpretation that, to me, they seem capable of bearing. Creativity, originality, evolutionary progress can arise only from within. They demand freedom and detachment and are illustrated in the Chinese tale of the stand in the house of Lu. Ch’ing was one of the most famous of Chinese cabinet makers who had reached the stage of creative art.

The Prince of Lu asked Ch’ing, who had finished a bit of furniture that seemed of supernatural execution, “What mystery is there in your art?”

“No mystery, Your Highness,” replied Ch’ing. “And yet, there is something.

“When I am about to make such a stand, I guard against any diminution of my vital power. I first reduce my mind to absolute quiescence. Three days in this condition, and I become oblivious of any reward to be gained. Seven days and I become unconscious of my four limbs and my physical frame. Then with no thought of the court present to my mind, my skill becomes concentrated, and all disturbing elements from without are gone. I enter some mountain forest, I search for a suitable tree. It contains the form required, which is afterwards elaborated. I see the stand in my mind’s eye and then set to work. Otherwise there is nothing. I bring my own natural capacity into

relation with that of the wood. What was suspected to be of supernatural execution in my work was due solely to this."

Whether this be history or parable its lesson is the same, the evolution of the world, or of society, must come from within.

I.

Our Notions of Evolution Have Been External

In a recent article by Mr. Hopkins¹, our readers were impressed by his clear and critical handling of philosophical, scientific, and historical phases of evolution. Those considerations have evoked some further question as to why the classical Darwinian doctrine has been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Mr. Hopkins seemed to indicate that the reason lay in the dominating obsession of the age now past by the outlooks of materialism and mechanism.

The term "evolution" in its very etymology indicates a movement from within outward, yet the constant effort has been made to explain and substantiate evolution by reference to external forces. The great stress was laid on environment, chance, and accident which are quite inadequate at any point, to account for creativity, progress, or development. The attempt was made to construct a world of novelty out of one where, by initial definition, novelty was impossible and all things proceeded by mechanical necessity.

The principle of "the Survival of the Fittest" has been treated as something apart from the indwelling "will" to survive on the part of the persisting organisms. The whole argument has been made to hang on the exterior accidents

¹*The Personalist*, Spring 1936.

of food, segregation, or climate. In some cases strength of muscle and jaw, accidentally acquired, the possession of fighting qualities, have been taken to account for survival, as in the saber-toothed tiger who didn't survive; and when the case required it, the survival has been accounted for by the absence of fighting qualities, as in the sheep. In other words, whatever survived was fit, and whatever was fit survived.

In a similar way "natural selection" instead of being assumed a matter of choices from within organisms mutually attracted, or moving from within the heart of nature herself acting as an organism, has been generally conceived as the forced result of survival.

None of these methods of external force has the least significance in the face of what a consistent theory of evolution demands. They lack the vitalizing element of novelty for they deal only with realities that are already here and whatever power they may have to reproduce themselves they have none to create anything unlike themselves or what has previously appeared. Change of quality is an internal process not to be accounted for by external force. If our universe were made up of bricks, we might pile them in many fantastic combinations, but we would never get other qualities than those already possessed by the brick. Such a world would be as devoid of the touch of living creativity as the blockhouse of the infant, and more, for the blocks would in this case be forced to pile themselves.

Our views of the progress and evolution of society have been hampered by the same mechanical and materialistic concepts. Malthus was the classical example of this. He treated society as if it were a problem in mathematics and time has made him ridiculous. Society is a living organism,

moved more by the free forces of emotion and spirituality than by external circumstance, and it is this fact that provides all the hope we can logically indulge that the future of society will not be as the past.

The daily social experience would teach us this were we not so dogmatically set on our naturalism. Here, again, we falsely assume that society is primarily dependent for its *progress* upon means of subsistence, economic wealth, commerce, trade and communication. We dream in these days, of the renewal of society by some forceful inhibition of free speech, some dictatorial regime, the private arming of those portions of society whose ideas correspond with ours, not seeing that such would mean the death of civilization, the end of progress.

Or, on the other hand, we vainly imagine that the equal distribution of wealth, or advantage, or education, will mean the renewal of society. Both these expedients suffer from a similar defect. They look only to mechanical external forces which have no vitalizing power. Power of police does not mean the regeneration of society. Even if we could build jails sufficient and could incarcerate the political majority, that would not indicate social redemption and a growing society. The great strength of society is now being spent on the securing of reforms by force and force can secure only its own destruction.

II.

All Creativity is From Within

The fact remains that all creativity of every kind is from within. It seems strange that the world has so long remained blind to the constructive and creative internal forces that are the sources of all progress made to date.

The marvel is that minds, priding themselves on their scientific detachment, could have remained blind to the facts of history, except, indeed, that fanciful history of an unknown past which they could construct out of their own scientific dogma.

Perhaps, however, we should be charitable, for men have been obsessed by ways of looking at things and the most blinding of all influences is dogma, either theological or scientific.

It was Socrates that first, in the Greek world, discovered the confirmatory evidence of the inner light as the guide to truth and the unerring reflection of the moving forces of the universe. Plato, in magnificent dream, disclosed the creative power of ideas and saw them as the fundamental realities. There was power, as well as truth and beauty, in the concept and for this we have the testimony of history. But Plato's ideas were disembodied ideas. He had his finger on the very forces of life and creativity and then failed through abstraction. Ideas are creative but apart from bodies, organisms, or individual wills they are non-subsistent and powerless. Someone must *have* the idea and someone must act on the idea. He must likewise be free to act, choosing one rather than another course, if anything new is to come into existence. The one necessary attendant of all creativity is freedom, and the perfect and supreme Creativity must be attended by Perfect Freedom.

Nor is some measure of freedom so rare as might be supposed. While it comes to largest exercise in reflective consciousness, there's not the simplest organism that grows which does not in some degree give evidence of choice. Even the unthinking atom itself has shown unpredictabilities of action that have made in science the most certain of all principles the principle of uncertainty.

This principle of uncertainty or, as I shall call it, this principle of freedom pervades all life and is the source of every creative effort.

To see this, we but need to look in the mirror of our own human effort. Creative genius grows out of detachment and freedom. So long as one is primarily bound to become famous, or rich, or to win the favor of society, or is embarrassed by the clumsy consciousness of his own hands, he cannot create. It is only by achieving a spirit of detachment that we arrive at creative freedom. The only man in human society who is really free is the man who fears none but God, and whose love for God is superior to every other interest. One such man, could we ever find him, would have power (provided he had also given himself to the technique) to revise the canons of art, to overthrow kingdoms, to change the face of human history. Being free through that service which is perfect freedom, is to be creative.

III.

The Moratorium in Evolution

Much neglected in argument has been what might be called *The Moratorium in Evolution*, the apparent absence of evolutionary processes from life as we know it. The night-mare of the mechanistic evolutionist has been his inability to produce the evidence, that is to show any specific case in which the struggle for survival or natural selection has actually produced a new species. In the absence of facts, he has resorted to analogies about as scientific as Kipling's *Just So Stories* to account for how the Giraffe got his neck or the Elephant his trunk. These scientific fairy stories have quieted the public mind and held in abeyance certain uncomfortable questions. When

pressed, we have been forced to admit that there are no specific instances, but either we have appealed to the fallacy of the abstract by saying it could happen in millions of years, or resorted to dogmatism by saying some day we shall discover "the missing link."

The question is a far more serious one than at first appears. If evolution is the dominating process that has made the world and us what we are, why has it now ceased to operate in a living world? The usual answer to this has been to pooh-pooh the galleries or to call names. It is, however, a fair question.

We hold no brief to protect the theory of evolution from its own mental shortcomings, but we think there may be a reasonable answer to this question. Possibly with the appearance of reflective consciousness, the world has entered on a new phase or epoch of evolution. Other æons or stages of evolution have been distinctly marked. Perhaps what amœba and cell, and bird and beast, have been blindly groping for in the following out of an inner urge, has now come in man to the stage of reflective self-consciousness. Plainly, in any unprejudiced view of evolution, man should view himself as a part of the process. Obviously he has reflective powers which are not the gift of the lower organisms. The production of such a being must have been hidden in the purpose of evolution. If so it is not too much to say that any further evolution must depend on what is already evolved, will not take place without the aid of man himself. Some day we may have the good sense to discover that the appearance of mind, of moral and spiritual self-consciousness was quite as important in the history of evolution as the change from a fin to a foot or to a wing.

What if evolution has made as much progress as is

possible without the presence within the subject of evolution of reflective self-consciousness.

Should this be proved to be the case, we can see that the halt in evolutionary progress may be but one of those æons of transmission like that from sea to land life, in which these higher embryonic powers may find themselves. Instead of a moratorium in evolution, it may be true that evolution is now in process of bringing in some new and higher phase. "The whole creation" may be seen as "groaning and travailing together in pain until now, waiting for the revelation of the Sons of God." Which text, by the way, constitutes for whomever needs it, a scriptural confirmation of the doctrine of evolution.

Such an answer can not be returned upon the old basis of an evolution forced by external circumstances, but only on the condition that it is an internal movement, an inner expression of life itself.

IV.

Creative Imagination and Future Culture

This view of evolution has several advantages of which we may name at least three.

First, it uses the term in a meaning consistent with the word, in that it places the force of evolution, the creative element within the structure or organism itself, where it obviously must be to work. In doing this, it likewise establishes a place for freedom in the structure of creation, thus ceasing to offend one of the most universal of human instincts.

Second, it vacates the demand for an automatic progress, which leaves the present apparent moratorium in evolutionary process and has the further disadvantage of

dulling the moral consciousness. Evolution ceases (if ever it was automatic) to be automatic with the appearance within the organism of reflective consciousness. Future progress in evolution is now dependent upon the exercise of brains and moral qualities, the choice to live by spiritual values. We may reflectively refuse to co-operate but we cannot escape moral responsibility.

Third, since future evolution is dependent upon the reflective, mental, emotional, and spiritual powers granted to man, it is able to overcome the physical limitations that hitherto have bound it. The future of the evolution of culture is discovered to be without known limit.

KEATS WALKS WITH BEAUTY

By WILLIAM VAN WYCK

ONE might have expected John Keats to appear on the literary horizon, flashing his colorful beauty, and to disappear in a nimbus of glory. Unfortunately for him, Byron held the stage at the moment of his appearance and that brilliant technician, for he is a little more than that, was not disposed to share laurels. A shallow, vain-glorious verse-maker, he had felt stung with resentment over adverse criticism, a resentment that had called forth *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*; so one might have supposed he would have been kinder to Keats' unusual beauty. The truth of the matter is that Byron lacked taste, for both his life and his poetry are flamboyantly tasteless and he had great difficulty in distinguishing between drama and melodrama, and between sentiment and sentimentality.

The man who gave the world the *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, the *Ode to a Nightingale* and the *Ode to Autumn* was a consummate artist with a perfection of taste that would escape the eyes of Lord Byron completely. Byron did indifferently what others did well, but Keats has done supremely what few others have approached, still fewer equalled, and none has ever surpassed. He is as great an English lyric poet as has ever lived, with a genius for classic beauty that has fallen to the level of the academic, that graveyard of literary ability.

To the lyric, Keats brought a new plasticity, a freshness of color, a startling imagery and a daring sense of words that had not appeared before his time. His pigmentation, so vital and so vivid, startled the die-hards of his day. They were not used to such color and it did not seem "quite nice" to them because they couldn't differentiate between the sensuous and the sensual.

Such an ecstasy of emotions as Keats exhibited was almost past bearing, and although Truth might sit at the bottom of her well as devoid of clothing as a fan-dancer, it was not expected of her to emerge and stroll about the premises in the pristine beauty of her nakedness. Exposing Truth as naked as the day she was born, Keats threw a spotlight of iridescence upon her.

No man has ever understood better the art of out-heroding Herod than did John Keats. His *Ode to Autumn* is a synthesis of all of the autumnal beauties that have ever been in this world and leaves a reader gasping in delight over its sheerness. Aside from the extraordinary quality of rhythm, aside from a choice of words that chase a pattern of beauty upon our hearts, Keatsian thought is couched in a magnificence of language that has rarely been encountered in the prosody of a tongue. The poet becomes Proteus' very self, wearing a garb of autumn of greater beauty than has ever been fashioned before.

"Where are the songs of spring? Ay, where are they?

Think not of them, thou hast thy music too,

While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day,
And touch the stubble-plains with rosy hue;

Then in a wailful choir the small gnats mourn

Among the river-sallows, borne aloft

Or sinking as the light wind lives or dies;
And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn;

Hedge-cricket sing, and now with treble soft

The redbreast whistles from a garden-croft,

And gathering swallows twitter in the skies."

What are the sheer essences of poetry here? First of all, we are flung into a sympathetic attitude toward the gnats through the qualifying word: small. It hurts us to think of the gnats mourning the departed summer. We have seen them a thousand times, and without paying any particular attention to them. But these little fellows in a

great pillar of wailing movement, present a new conception of poetry. The lark, the nightingale, the rose, or any of the flora and fauna with an intrinsic innate beauty have been the properties of the poet since time immemorial. We know all about these and they bring a beauty *per se*. Now gnats do not; we look upon gnats as a rather disagreeable asset of Dame Nature, something to brush away with an irritated wave of the hand. Due to Keats' artistry, he has taken this rather humble living symbol and rendered it majestic, giving gnats the right to exist in poetry, a startlingly beautiful symbol of sorrow because he places them before a background of river-swallows and a light wind that lives or dies. This is no poem of polite regret and the danger to have made it so was very great. This is a poem of intense regret, heightened by an amazing pictorial beauty. The use of language is nigh to perfection, the color, and scent and the psychosis of the autumn is there.

As high-priest of beauty, Keats preaches beauty passionately. He makes his readers feel a need of beauty such as they may have never felt before and passing far beyond this, he actually supplies this beauty.

In the *Ode on a Grecian Urn*, he vitalized that urn far better than the urn does itself. This is the finest apotheosis of arrested motion in the English language, going beyond the arrested motion of the thing itself, for the very essence of this poem is the ecstasy of arrested movement, because due to this, that which can never be accomplished must endure forever. Even the immortal bard himself has created no greater lyric poetry.

Keats walks with beauty as the saints of old walked with God. With one word he gives us vistas of emotion. "The self-same song that found a path through the sad

heart of Ruth, when, sick for home, she stood in tears among the alien corn." Is there anything more familiar to us than grain? When the grain becomes alien, nostalgia has reached a supreme height of intensity. With one word, Keats succeeds in bringing to us a depth of homesickness that strikes a very sympathetic chord in the hearts of all readers who have undergone nostalgic throes. A dozen pages might be written about homesickness that could not give a tithe of the poignancy of the words: "alien corn." This, of course, is the function of the artist, but few ever achieve it. An economy of words that substitutes satisfactorily for a reasonable compliment of words is only within the power of great writers. And when this economy reaches to the dizzyest poetic heights, the world must blaze a path to the door of a major poet. So few poets have ever attained their majority in the English language that they may be counted on the fingers of the hands. And Keats was dead at twenty-six. Does this imply that lyric genius belongs to youth? I have the feeling that it does, youth plus intuition. Would senescence have turned Keats into a great tragic poet? One cannot say. Senescence would have stilled the lark's voice and it might have been replaced by something that would have rivalled the epic qualities of Avon's bard of bards. Shakespeare is a complete symphony, Milton is an organ. Shelley is a violin and Keats is a 'cello. His richness of tone bears us to a realm of sorrowful joy that is achieved only by the consummate artist.

It is due to this poet's passionate love of beauty that he was not accepted immediately by the critics and colleagues of his day. The Englishman is ever shy before a depth of emotional expression and the groundling was blinded by the incandescence that greeted his wondering eyes, leaving him both worried and uncomfortable. Pre-Victorian readers

were not used to passion couched in such startlingly magnificent language. The sheer force of it nearly jerked them out of their easy chairs, leaving them with the feeling that they had entered a holy of holies by mistake, and, feeling themselves to be intruding upon a soul starkly naked and engaged in taking a sun-bath in the cosmic rays of the universe, they did not know whether they should tip-toe out, closing the door quietly behind them, or remain to stare agape at beauty revealed to them suddenly through Keatsian eyes. It took time for the world to appreciate this poet's panorama of passion.

YOUTH AND AGE

By H. RAYNESFORD MULDER

Swift years swept by, while I sensed not how time
Had flung us each apart or how Life's flame
Could so reflect, until it cease to climb,
Knowing no flight beyond the puny game
Of daily fret; a ship bereft of mate
With crew of but yourself to find the port
Of nameless destination. Blinding fate!
Will no sword-thrust of words unlock that court
Of reticence, release again the song
You mastered once, and taught me my first note?
Your hope was then of mountain height and strong . . .
But age has walled within what youth would quote:
"Eternity is at the heart of sorrow,
Vision beyond the task or lose tomorrow."

DAY-DREAM AND LIFE

By THE LATE SIR JOHN ADAMS

A LONG while ago now Dr. Sigismund Freud made up his mind that all our dreams are merely our endeavours to obtain a factitious satisfaction of our thwarted desires. Every dream, he tells us, is the mental reconstruction of events in such a way as to gratify a wish. Things do not go in the real world as we would like them, so we put matters right in dreamland, where we are free from the regrettable restrictions imposed upon us by that disagreeable complex commonly called the "nature of things." Or at any rate Dreamland is *nearly* free from troublesome restrictions: for there is left an annoying inhibiting force with which we must reckon. But even that, as we shall see, may be manipulated by a skilful dreamer in a way that is not at all applicable to the hard facts of life.

The wish theory bristles with difficulties. We dream that some dear one is dead, and turn reproachfully to the Freudian and ask if he calls that the fulfilment of a wish. He explains courteously enough, that he does not believe that *now* you desire the removal of your loved one: but he asks meaningly, "was there never a time when you would have welcomed the passing of him (her) who is now so dear to you, and has been so—with a trifling lapse now and then—all along. Our answer is not always so ready as we should like it to be.

Then a doctor dreams in the most sympathetic way about another doctor of his acquaintance who makes a serious mistake in diagnosis, and is exposed to severe public criticism. In the dream the dreamer is full of respect for his colleague, in fact more full of respect than during waking hours. The Freudian maintains that this

dream is a plain fulfilment of the dreamer's desire to see his rival humiliated. But what about the respect and sympathy in the dream? Would it not be a much more satisfactory fulfilment of the wish, if we dreamt of the rival being caught in a blunder in such a way that we could openly gloat over him. The Freudian admits the force of the argument, but maintains that in dreaming a certain reserve is necessary, if we are to have our desires gratified at all; for there has to be overcome that inhibiting force to which we referred in the first paragraph. Compelled, like all psychologists sooner or later, to fall back upon a metaphor, Freud calls this force the censor. Her function (if we freely grant Freud his metaphor, surely he will not cavil at the gender we adopt) is to keep our dreams within reasonable bounds. We might all like to dream terrible evils happening to our enemies, and to picture them in the most disgraceful plights, and then openly glory in their shame. It is here that the censor interferes, and might use Browning's line:

“‘Nay, But there's a decency required!’ quoth she.”

In order to get our dreams past the censor, we must modify them in such a way as to deceive her into believing them harmless and respectable; but Freud assures us that if we can but analyse them aright they will always be found to embody a more or less reputable wish. The ingenuity he and his followers expend on their work of analysis is so amazing that it rouses the profoundest doubt in the minds of those who interest themselves in these matters. Can it be possible, we ask ourselves, that we are such terribly deep persons as all this makes us out to be? No doubt on the frail human side we are rather flattered at the implied complexity of our mental processes, but that part of us that is given over to science, and logic and such

matters, is not happy about the whole scheme of wish-fulfilment in dreamland.

It is true that there are pleasant, plain-sailing dreams that are obviously the fulfilment of our wishes. Often we wake up in the middle of such a dream, and do our futile best to fall asleep again quickly, so as to "continue in our next" the glorious tale that we would fain make a serial. What gives rise to scepticism? Is it the dream that is distorted in order to hoodwink the censor?

Yet there is a class of dreams that appear to satisfy, in every case, the Freudian demand. Day-dreaming owes all its charm to its powers of giving, on the dream plane, immediate effect to our wishes. Tired with the continual rebuffs resulting from the nature of things in real life, the soul deliberately withdraws within itself, and makes an ideal reconstruction of things as we wish them to be. We have all done this sort of thing, and as a rule experienced little difficulty either in starting the process, or in keeping it up. We are naturally a little curious about the status of the censor here. Why does she not interfere? Freud tells us that she is specially alert during our waking hours, and that it is only during the hours of sleep that she so far loses her keenness as to be imposed on by the distortions that afterwards give the psychoanalysts such trouble to interpret. But underlying all that we have heard about the censor, is the assumption that her function is a moral one. So strong is the tendency to make her a moralist that many people who read Freud are inclined to ask him how his censor differs from the old-fashioned unpersonified *conscience*. The answer is that the conception of the Freudian censor does not necessarily involve moral evaluation at all. Her business is to see that certain acts or

modes of thought, points of view and what not, are duly respected. Morality is included among these, but does not by any means dominate the situation as conventionally-minded people take for granted. The censor represents the paid-up capital of the experience of the soul concerned. A hypocrite, for example, while living with religious people, must depend upon his censor to keep him from saying and doing things that are out of keeping with his present environment. So in speaking a foreign language we give the censor the work of inhibiting our irritating tendency to employ words and constructions alien to the speech we are using. In this view, the censor has obviously a place in day-dreaming.

To begin with, she may be a little concerned on the moral side: for though her work is not exclusively moral, she is not precluded from dealing with morality. She may object altogether to day-dreaming, for example, and regard it as a demoralising habit. Strengthened by the disapproval of teachers and parents she may do her best to inhibit the whole process. But even when the paid-up capital in experience and thought of the person concerned, is sufficiently great to overcome the inhibition, and institute a day-dream, the censor has still functions to perform. Her business now is to keep the train of ideas within the bounds of possibility. She would probably like to keep to the still stricter limits of *probability*, but such restraint would, for most people, completely take the charm out of day-dreaming, though the highest kinds of day-dreams are those that insist most on probability. For a little self-examination will show that we never really enjoy a day-dream that is quite divorced from probability. In order that a day-dream may give its full flavour, there must be means and ends, difficulties and surmounting of difficulties. No doubt the

difficulties must be surmounted with all speed, and with the minimum amount of effort. Things must fit in easily, co-incidence must be worked for all it is worth, everything must be reached by pleasant short-cuts. But if there is to be real enjoyment, a process of some kind there must be. Thus at the very beginning the censor gets her hand in. She does not allow us to start too high. We must begin somewhere not too far removed from the point at which we stand in real life. The girl who starts her day-dream by being a princess straightaway with Prince Charming by her side, spoils her chances of the higher delights. Her censor is clearly not in good condition. The period between princesshood and happy-ever-afterwards is apt, in these circumstances, to be foreshortened unduly, and the dream comes to an uneasy end in the vagueness of uneventful enjoyment of life.

We all day-dream to some extent, though we have all our special ways of day-dreaming, and most of us are rather reticent in speaking of our way of carrying on the process. We are fortunate, therefore, in catching a first-rate novelist actually describing his technique. In his *Autobiography*, Anthony Trollope lays bare his procedure. He characteristically confined his day-dreaming within definite limits, binding himself down :

“to certain laws, to certain proportions, properties and unities. Nothing impossible was ever introduced—nor even anything which, from outward circumstances, would seem to be violently improbable. I myself was, of course my own hero. Such is the necessity of castle-building. But I never became a king or a duke—much less, when my height and personal appearance were fixed, could I be an Antinous or six feet high. I was never a learned man or a philosopher. But I was a very clever person, and beautiful young women

used to be fond of me. And I strove to be kind of heart and open of hand, and noble in thought: and altogether I was a very much better fellow than I have ever succeeded in being since. . . . I learned in this way to maintain an interest in a fictitious story, and to live in a world altogether outside the world of my own material life. In after years I have often done the same—with this difference, that I have discarded the hero of my early dreams, and have been able to lay my own identity aside.”

This applies to the period when the novelist was a clerk in the civil service at four hundred fifty dollars a year, and his description of the difference between his early and his later day-dreaming cannot be taken as typical of the ordinary human being: it was specifically the professional development of a novelist. Most of us do not wrench ourselves from the central place in our dream world. We begin with occupying the centre of the limelight in our childish day-dreaming, and most of us keep our place there till the curtain falls.

In dealing with the use of the Fable in teaching children, Rousseau in the *Emile* makes very clear the state of affairs at the early stage. He points out that pupils do not learn the lesson that the fable is supposed to teach, but something quite different; the reason being that the youngsters persist in putting themselves in the place of the winning character. In the *Ant and the Cricket* he does not put himself in the place of the cricket and learn a lesson of thrift; he takes the part of the Ant and learns a lesson of self-complacency and stinginess. In the *Fox and the Crow* the child puts himself in the place of the Fox and learns a lesson in flattery and low cunning. In the *Lion and the Mouse* the child plays the part of the Mouse, though on all other occasions he takes the Lion's rôle.

The same thing goes on as the child develops. He plays the same game in the Fables of his maturer years. For it may be not unreasonably maintained that the place of the Fables in the nursery is taken in adult life by the Movies. To be sure I shall be met at once by the question: "Do you seriously suggest that the screen has anything to do with the teaching of morals?" When this question has got the negative answer it demands, we may turn to the point of resemblance between the two. This will be found in the fact that in both cases the human being casts himself for the winning part. We sometimes wonder how sensible, intelligent people can put up with the absurdities presented on the screen. Things are presented there that by no possibility could happen in plain unmanipulated life, and we tolerate them because we rejoice in the freedom from inhibitions. This is sometimes called the psychology of escape. But the attraction of the screen goes beyond mere negation. People get a positive satisfaction in putting themselves in the place of the screen characters that do such wonderful things before their eyes. What children do with their fables, grown-ups do with their Movies. The darkened "picture-house" is particularly well suited for day-dreaming, and the screen supplies material for those whose imaginations are quite efficient on the constructive side, though somewhat weak on the creative. Such frequenters of the Kinema do their day-dreaming by proxy. All they have to do is to slip their personality into that of the character that attracts them most in the story, and let themselves play his part throughout. The day-dreamer is free from all responsibility for the possibility or probability of the incidents. All he has to do is to let himself go. His censor may take a nap.

In real life the censor's business in connection with day-

dreaming is to interpolate as many processes as possible between the mild beginning and the glorious end, and to secure that in these processes due attention is paid to the nature of things," insofar as that nature is not in itself modified by dream conditions. Her work may be well illustrated by what she does in other departments.

Novel-writing is not far removed from day-dreaming, and in the writing of novels authors depend greatly upon the censor. She must carefully scrutinize the assumptions of the plot, and throughout its development must be on the watch for anything that is inconsistent with these assumptions. In the grotesque novel (e.g., Jules Verne and H. G. Wells) we have the nearest approach to the day-dream. When an author sits down to write one of these fanciful tales he makes certain assumptions, unwarrantable assumptions. These the censor does not like, and so far as they are concerned she has to be bludgeoned into accepting them. But once they are accepted, she is within her rights in protesting against anything that goes against them. It will be found that the best novelists are scrupulously careful in maintaining the consistencies demanded by the censor. When Mr. Wells in *The Invisible Man*, has brushed aside the censor's remonstrances against the possibility of a man becoming invisible, he is extremely careful to make all that follows conform strictly to the ordinary laws of nature. For example, the newly swallowed food remains visible till it has been assimilated and therefore an organic part of the man, and accordingly invisible. Apart from the one unwarrantable assumption of the transforming power of the Indian stone, *Vice Versa* is an extremely accurate account of what might take place in an ordinary home and school.

So with our day-dreams. If they are to be justifiable the

censor's work must be thorough. But the preliminary question has to be faced about that preliminary bludgeoning of the censor before the dream begins. Is it ever legitimate to day-dream? There are those who are very firm on this point. They maintain that all "stuff and nonsense" of this kind only unsettles children's minds, and makes them incapable of doing their proper work in this exacting, practical world. Do not let us take shelter here under the promising cover of the impossibility of getting away from day-dreaming. It is true that in a certain sense we are day-dreaming in most parts of our daily life. A large part of our speculation, including scientific speculation, is a kind of day-dreaming: every hypothesis owes its birth to the imagining of a state of things different from that with which we are familiar. False hypotheses are merely day-dreams that have gone wrong, whereas those that have succeeded are claimed not to have been day dreams at all, since they represented what was actually true. But passing by in the meantime this unfair discrimination, and accepting the Freudian view that the dream is an attempt to satisfy, on the mental plane, some ordinary human wish, it would seem that day-dreaming may be justified—if certain conditions be observed.

To begin with, syncopation must be kept in check; processes must not be cut too short, means must be considered as well as ends. A dream that is merely a series of pictures of ends attained, with no record of means or efforts, is one to be avoided. It exhausts all the energies of the dreamer in the mere enjoyment of the pictures he has created. It is no more than a gloating. Fortunately this static enjoyment of ready-made results gives a much inferior pleasure to that which accompanies the dynamic process in which attention is divided between ends and means. The contrast

between the actual and the ideal is more enjoyed when there is an effort to bridge the gulf between them. Even in the classical case of Alnaschar, with its blatant moral, there could have been little enjoyment for the dealer in brittle wares had he merely imagined himself at once to be the important person who kicked out his rival. There had to be steps—handsomely abbreviated, no doubt, but still steps—between his present obscurity and his ultimate glory, otherwise that glory would have lost some of its splendour. What the moralist objects to in day-dreaming is the lotus-eating attitude it tends to induce, and so far as the static variety of day-dreaming is concerned the objection is justified. The person whose ideal enjoyment is “lying on a sofa reading novels,” has no right to condemn the passive enjoyment of the day-dream, but most other people have. What is wanted is a kind of day-dreaming that is in itself active, and is likely to lead to further activity outside of dreamland.

As indicated above, the moralist is sometimes not a little unfair in treating of this subject. He adopts a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose attitude. If the dream leads to nothing, it is a waste of time and therefore bad. But if it does lead to something, then, of course, it was not a day-dream at all. When Warren Hastings as a boy of seven “lay on the bank of the rivulet which flows through the old domain of his house to join the Isis,” and dreamed that he would go afield, and make his fortune, and come back, and become, like his forebears, Hastings of Daylesford, he was day-dreaming. That he actually brought to pass much of what he had dreamed, does not in any way alter the fact that it was dreaming. A day-dream that includes processes as well as results is a thing to be fostered.

The function of the day-dream may be well illustrated

by reference to the work of teachers. The profession has been of late driven into a curiously inconsistent attitude with regard to this subject. Teachers are notoriously severe against a process that interferes seriously with their claims for attention to school subjects. In this they are certainly justified, for one of the conditions under which day-dreaming may be permitted, is that it must be carried on only when the time and place are fit; and school-hours do not meet this condition. But in the schools of today there has developed an ideal that really demands a kind of day-dreaming. This is what is called *Appreciation*. Books and articles have been written urging teachers to try to get their pupils to appreciate the authors they read in their literature lessons. The essence of the method adopted is to get the pupil to put himself in the place of the author as he wrote the passage. The teacher wants the pupil to think for himself the thoughts that were in the author's mind as he wrote. To follow the author (particularly the poet) in this way is in many cases to dream again the dreams the poet has dreamt. At present the important point is whether there is not more danger in this appreciative after-dreaming than in the roundly condemned day-dreaming. When the literature teacher has had his will and reduced most of his class to a drowsy-eyed re-dreaming of the glorious dream of the poet, are not the pupils in a parlous state? Are they not merely enjoying passively the beauties lent them by the poet, and becoming to that extent less fit for the real work of life? Fortunately even common-sense English-speaking people no longer accept Locke's deplorable views on poetry; and the scurvy treatment the poets received at the hands of Plato himself loses its didactic value when we remember how much dreaming he did on his own account. We have today reached that stage at which we believe it possible to

enjoy poetry in moderation without losing touch with the realities of life.

But indeed there is a fundamental difference between the state of the passive poets and the day-dreamers. Both no doubt passively enjoy the dream-life that is carried on in their souls. But there is a stronger personal element in day-dreaming than in the passive enjoyment of the poetry made by another. No doubt the German students of Aesthetics emphasize the projection of the reader's personality into the matter that the poet presents to him. But there is a world of difference between thrusting oneself into an environment already created by another, and creating an environment for ourselves. It is here that Freudian conception of the dream as a wish-fulfiller provides a clear demarcation between the two enjoyments. The passive-poet may enjoy his experiences in the environment provided by the active poet, and return unimpaired to the hard facts of life. He has been living in another world, and comes back refreshed to a world that he does not expect to have changed during his absence. The day-dreamer coming back from a world deliberately differentiated *by himself* from that of daily life, may come back either refreshed or dispirited, according to the kind of differentiation produced. The necessary connection now recognized by psychologists as existing between emotion and a corresponding activity, has a very clear bearing here. An emotion that expends itself upon itself may be permitted as an occasional relaxation; but wherever possible an emotion should be made to lead to some activity co-ordinated with it. A wise arrangement of our emotional life is to confine the passive enjoyment to states produced by the reaction from others, and to have in every case of day-dreaming an active element leading towards some more or less practical application.

TRAGEDY, COMEDY, AND THE AUDIENCE

By ELEANOR A. LODGE

AS far as tragedy is concerned, theater-lovers are well-schooled. They are sensitive to definite standards of tragic creation, and woe betide the artist who does not conform when he labels his *magnum opus* "A Tragedy!" They have all been nurtured on Shakespeare's Big Four, *Hamlet*, *Othello*, *Macbeth*, and *King Lear*, fed to them in carefully measured doses. In school, each has said to himself: "I do not propose to know too much about the subject. That way pedantry lies. I shall not study each and every comment. I will enjoy the plays as plays, and will leave the rest to A. C. Bradley. If I read his book, I shall know all I need know in order to understand, not only Shakespearean tragedy, but *all* tragedy. Bradley is right. Tragedy is essentially waste, and it is sublime to survey a great ideal with awe, and to be defeated by this great ideal."

His schooling over, the Shakespeare-lover, having completed his collection of the great man's works, all bound in red leather, places the volumes carefully on the shelf, and then turns to his own generation. He proceeds to patronize the moderns. For he is equipped, by Shakespeare and Mr. Bradley, to judge all tragedies. Portray a great spirit broken by a great ideal, and he will applaud. Portray sordid humanity whimpering beneath the lash of a very imperfect civilization, and he will turn his back with a shudder, and will pass by on the other side. Yes, indeed! Tragedy belongs only to the realm of sublime ideals. These modern deformities are ugly, unpleasant, low. They will never achieve permanent artistic value. Hauptmann's "*Weavers*" is pure waste of the author's time, and is there any sublimity at all in Ibsen's "*Ghosts*"?

In the case of tragedy, then, the members of the audience are rigidly determined to bring all modern efforts to the touchstone of their own training. They look for what they have been taught to expect. They shut their eyes to anything new and inconsistent with the authorities of their youth. In their every-day living, it is true that they will be affected by the tragic horror of a friend dying in loneliness and poverty, or the tragic pathos of a baby burnt to death. But when they go to the theater, they are hard as nails. They do not come to sentimentalize. Have they not been told, by Allardyce Nicoll, that no genuine tragedy is written to command our tears? We cannot feel pity for our superiors, the heroes of genuine tragedy. If, then, a modern play is not sufficiently powerful to prevent us from giving way to these "stupid" tears, it is simply not true tragedy. The syllogism is perfect.

The unfortunate thing about this learned rigidity on the part of the audience is that it closes our eyes to a real part of living. If we train ourselves to look for one kind of tragedy in the theater, and a different kind in real life, we bifurcate experience, and blind ourselves to the real meaning, both of tragedy and of life. As wholes, both tragedy and life overlap, and sometimes coincide. The playwright realizes this, and uses the tragic material of everyday life to give substance to the tragic ideal which his dramatization embodies. If we, in the audience, could bring ourselves to appreciate his aim, we should reciprocate, not only by appreciating the tragic ideal in the modern theater, but also by interpreting the tragic incidents of everyday life in the light of the playwright's ideal. We could then apply what we learn when we recreate, to what we do when we create our own living.

The trouble is, that we underestimate our own garden,

while our eyes look longingly at the playwright's garden. There we see and know all the accepted species of cultivated plants: Grecian tragedy, with its offshoots, the unities and the chorus; Elizabethan tragedy, that flourishing shrub on which he espies the classicists, the romanticists, and the university wits; Heroic tragedy, seeded by Dryden; the Horror-tragedy of Webster and Ford; and the Domestic tragedy of Pinero and Jones. We know them all. We know how they are made to bloom. We know how most of them need a Tragic Hero apiece, with a constant sprinkling of the sense of the Fates, how many of them flourish very nicely on Symbolism and the Pathetic Fallacy, and how that nasty old canker-worm, the Sub-plot, is gnawing at most of their roots. All this we know in the theater; but we fail to apply it to our own lives. We leave our own garden uncared for, unweeded, its family tree unpruned. We fail to separate the accompanying circumstances by neat little walks, flanked by sprigs of recognition and reconciliation. We fail to use the unities of time and place and action to rake aside our grudges and prejudices, to make a pleasant sojourning-place, watered well with ideals.

In the case of comedy, however, we have no such learned equipment for its appreciation. It was not fed to us in our youth. We were not brought up on explained jokes, forced humor, comedy by rule, and laughter at a dictator's nod. Perhaps comedy is too superficial, too trivial, too whimsical for such treatment. Anyway, in the case of comedy, we were left more to ourselves. Like Topsy, we "just grewed."

Our training in tragedy, but not in comedy, led to one peculiar result. Children are imitative. The tragedies we were taught to learn and love became part of our being. Since we had no parallel equipment in the field of comedy,

we tended to express our joy in living in the medium appropriate only to tragedy. We tended to compose tragic odes, solemn little sonnets, weepy love songs. Like cheerful Germans, carolling lustily about how *traurig* they are, we expressed our joyous vitality in terms of the only technique we knew, the technique of the mournful odes of High School, the brooding sighs of Byron, the tense eroticism of Rosetti. These were our only models, and these we imitated.

When we grow to man's estate, we theater-lovers take ourselves in hand, and face the issue: "Bradley has taught me the meaning of tragedy; is there no one who can teach me the meaning of comedy, and provide me with a criterion of judgment for all plays, ancient and modern, which fall under this head?" Bergson comes as the answer to our prayer, and him we read and analyze. But as we come to Bergson with the critical powers which have developed in reflective living, in place of the school-child's docility with which we came to Bradley, we soon discover that his formula is not completely satisfying. In the first place, he describes examples from plays with which we are unfamiliar, and to many of us his examples seem distinctly uncomic, dull, flat. In the second place, he harps on the note "mechanical" in all the octaves. But this note, with its overtone of "absentmindedness" in one octave, "automatism" in another, and "insensibility" in a third, has only a single fundamental. "Mechanism" is an idea which, with Bergson, never grows. It simply spreads. Real growth pushes down and reaches upward. Spreading is the effect of arrested development. It indicates an accumulation of observations within one field only, and satisfies the curiosity only of the observer himself, and of those docile souls who are content to let Bergson do all the observing. Bergson's formula is stimulating, but incomplete.

Bergson points the way when he says "All laughter is social, and is fundamentally the reproof of a particular society to any eccentricity on the part of its own members." Allardyce Nicoll makes this definition more concrete, by saying "The absurd character puts forward all his follies unconsciously to the world; the man of wit sneers and mocks at everything different from himself; the humorist is an eccentric who sees the fun of his eccentricity." Barrie advances the theory that "Humor is the union of conscious with unconscious laughter." But all such formulas leave the theater-lover puzzled. Evidently, the bubbling spirits engendered by participating in comedy have caused these men to rise to great heights, as they coin their epigrams about the spirit of comedy. But how can we find the meaning of such epigrams, test their truth, and make of them a workable criterion for the appreciation of comedy?

In themselves, all such formulas are brilliant failures. But let us go back to their source, the living theater. Here we can observe and learn. One fact stands out. We appreciate the meaning of a comedy better than when we participate in it as acted, rather than as read. Tragedy may have a personal meaning, a sweeping rhythm which may engulf and transport the reader, even in the familiar surroundings of his quiet study. But comedy comes alive only in the acting, only in the theater. What does this mean?

Let us focus our attention upon the factor which makes all the difference, upon the agent that transmits the comic spirit from the playwright's pen to the collective intelligence of the audience. The comic spirit comes to life, not in the playwright alone, and not in the audience alone. It needs the actor to transmit joyous living, the actor, with his supple technique developed for precisely such transmission.

Once we fully appreciate the actor's comic sensitivity, we have our much-sought criterion, the flexible, living criterion by which we can distinguish between near-comedy and the real thing.

As our technical appreciation of the acting improves, so does our grasp of comedy. We notice that the actors, when performing a Shaw play, key themselves to the Shavian roulades. They develop a carefully polished technique, and submerge their individual styles, uniting to give a theatrical unity to an otherwise most uneven wit. Puns and epigrams, subtleties and home-truths, all are delivered in the same way, rattled off at a swiftly moving *tempo*, to keep the play in the air, to keep it moving. The actor trains himself to move with a spontaneity and gaiety which makes his artificial and calculated moves take on a perfectly natural appearance. He tosses the playwright's witticisms into the air before the audience sees them coming. Then he slackens his pace until the audience catches up and passes him, sensing the direction in which he is moving. When he conforms to this expectation, the audience applauds, participating fully in the life of the comedy.

The life of comedy, as of all drama, is conflict, conflict of persons, conflict of forces, conflict of ideas. In comedy, the conflicts of the *dramatis personae* are trivial, the conflict of forces, relatively unimportant. The essential conflict is between playwright and audience. The playwright is intent on shocking the conventional, every-day ideas of the audience. Ever present to his mind is the *de te fabula narratur*. The audience is intent on broadening and deepening the meaning of the situations presented, universalizing them, and so robbing the shocks of their personal sting. Comedy is thus a kind of game, and in this game the actor plays on

both sides. He amplifies the playwright's lessons, and accentuates the tension between dramatist and audience. But he also plays on the side of the audience, suggesting, by his actor's technique, that the situations are universal, the characters types, the phrases trite, and the ideas acceptable to all. He succeeds in making the audience anticipate what is coming, and enjoy their own astuteness, their superiority to the playwright, with that "sudden glory" which expresses itself in laughter.

For what the audience really notices, if the actor does his work well, is not so much the playwright and his ideas, nor even the actor's creative technique in giving reality and force to those ideas. The members of the audience notice their own cleverness in appreciating the movement of ideas, in entering into the life of the play, in understanding the universality of its meaning even better, as they suppose, than either author or actor. They rejoice in their own quick play of ideas, and laugh, not at themselves, but at the cleverness, brilliance even, with which they participate in the movements of a drama which is alive with their own life. They remember but little of what the author wrote and the actor did. They remember chiefly the tears of laughter which rolled down their faces, as they, and the rest of the audience, dominated the situation by holding up the play until their laughter had subsided. Actors and playwrights have combined, they know, to give them the opportunity to experience their superiority, the flattering sense of having made the winning move in a thoroughly friendly game, and so they return for more.

The theater-lover is in part satisfied. He has made this discovery for himself, and is not dependent upon the voice of authority. Let M. Bergson wind up his toys and laugh as

they behave the same way each time, if he can. But for the lover of comedy in the theater, there is no life in that. He takes home from the living theater his packet of comic appreciation, and plants the seeds in his front garden, proudly displaying his discovery. The neighboring gardener, who has been well schooled in comedy as well as in tragedy, will nod in recognition of the plants as they grow. He will call this one "Comedy of Romance," that one "Comedy of Humours," this other one "Comedy of Manners." Another he will call "Genteel Comedy," and yet another "Comedy of Intrigue." But what does the lover, who has learnt to enjoy his comedy in the theater, care for such names? To him they are belated rulings. To him the comedies themselves are not species, logically differentiated concepts or class-names. They are what they were when he first wooed and won them in their own home: the lovable and memorable laughs he enjoyed when participating in their life. What he found laughable was his own discovery. It stands out as a landmark of his wit, insight, depth of feeling, richness of experience. For him, tragedy is crystallized and beautiful, stereotyped and sacred; but its beauty is fixed, sculptural. Comedy is still growing. It is a sparkling current, winding on and on, broadening as the range of conflicts between the author and audience widens, deepening with the depth of insight which comes to all who, in the theater, participate fully in its life.

BERGSON AND GREEK MYSTICISM

By M. WHITCOMB HESS

IN his last book Bergson says that mysticism was never attained by Greek thought. He does not even admit Plotinus to the company of mystics. "It was granted to him to look upon the promised land," the French apologist for intuition concedes, "but not to set foot upon its soil."¹ His error seems to have been in remaining too faithful to "Greek intellectualism." There are, however, two separate branches of Greek philosophy, both starting from Aristotle. One, a development of Plato's doctrine of the Ideas which entails a system of development whose apex is the *Actus Purus* just as Plato's was the *Good*, and the implications of which are ethical and religious; the other is the syllogistic or formal logic which is a subversion of the teaching of Plato regarding the universal. Though the Neo-Platonists subscribed to the Aristotelian logic their founder's whole concern was with the *Actus Purus* whose workings constitute (as they pervade) the universe. When Plotinus declared of truth that "each fragment present as a unit lives as a universal" he disregarded the implications in Aristotelian logic (which recognizes separable particulars and universals) and followed the original Greek conception of reality as it culminated in Aristotle's metaphysical monism, a doctrine that is disparate with his logic. That logic represented neither the truth of Greek philosophy nor the intellect's *modus operandi*.

Bergson's attack on intellectualism rests on his acceptance of formal logic as a valid expression of the workings of the intellect. His indictment of it as rejecting all creative activity finds expression in such words as those oft-quoted in the Preface to *Creative Evolution*: "Our logic is pre-

¹Bergson, Henri: *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, p. 210.

eminently the logic of solids." Some static quality is essential, of course, to the object of analyses. But does this mean that analysis itself is to be considered static? Analysis of the thought-process showing it "a rigid unconscious skeleton" rather than a living articulating reality, whatever else it may be, is *not* an analysis of the thought-process. The intellect, which according to Bergson cannot comprehend life, must be "thrust outside itself by an act of will" so that the instinct which is "molded on the very form of life" may have sway. But the "act of will" can be nothing other than the rebellion of a superior intelligence to the half-truths of a lesser one, and the limits imposed by them. That it is impossible for truth to have an antecedent framework has been the battle-cry from Greek philosophy downward. The *that* and the *what*, or the particular and the universal, are always mutual transcendents, and a developing knowledge situation, though it may show them as reconstructed in the reconstruction of each phase, shows them also as identical at any stage. Recognized in the Aristotelian metaphysic as the doctrine of form and matter, this truth nevertheless was travestied in the Aristotelian logic. Formal logic, based on a forced implementation of the universal, is open to the criticism that it does not have to do with the creativity of living thought. According to this logic the universal was the original and derivation from it showed knowledge of the particular by deduction; induction on the other hand was knowledge rising to the universal. According to the true essence, or logically, science was apodictic; but psychologically it was epagogic. The completed science was to be learned deductively, but in those that were still "becoming" knowledge was to be gained by induction. These words, commonplaces in education, have, as a matter of fact no meaning. They describe non-existent methodolo-

gies in learning. Separation of a law from its instances or instances from their law is an impossibility. When the language teacher writes a rule for tense-sequence on the black-board and asks his pupils to find illustrations in their reading he is not teaching by deduction, nor by induction when he asks their formulation of the rule from a number of examples. In each case the identity of law and instances is taken for granted. To think of the universal in thought as that middle term to which particulars rise and from which they descend in turn describing the perfect circle of logic is to think of the elaborate pretences at separation that have distinguished all types of formal logic, and the sport such logic makes of actual thought-process. The various symbolisms for logic have taken for their starting points the old error which would hold the universal off from the particular fact in order to bring the two together again. The modern mathematical logician evidently believes that numbers universalize with minimal particularity. But his equations are nothing but quantitative attributes of the original propositions and have no more to do with them than can be expressed mathematically;² and a tautology of quantities is no more capable of showing structure of thought than the old logical circle. That two and two are always four does not mean that they may not also be something more. But this something more is outside the reach of mathematics whether the consideration is Socrates' mortality or, as in the words of the old English folksong, "The Ten Commandments," the reference is to the "two and two" that are "lily-white babes, a-clothed all in green, O!"

II.

Sculpture, from which Aristotle took his famous anal-

²See my articles: *Epistemology and Symbolism* and *Mathematical Logic and Modern Positivism*, in vols. xxix and xxx, *The Journal of Philosophy*.

ogy in order to show the universal as ultimate in a developmental range, does not represent the universal as separable from the particular — an impossibility even for art — but as that ideal goal which, embraced, is also the quintessence of particularity. Expression of both particularity and universality in course of creation in any art-work depends on a view of the completed work in the artist's mind which may be used as a standard for the order of progression whether from the particular to the universal or the universal to the particular. Only as the sense-media may lend themselves to representation of one or the other chameleon distinctions in a knowledge situation — the particular and the universal — is the one or the other to be used as starting point. Whether the particular or the universal is seen as primitive it is always *in relation to the completed art-work as the artist has envisioned it*. The two factors are throughout no less inseparable in art than in epistemology. Only because the knowledge was already whole in the artist's mind could the particular or the universal play a rôle of subservience in artistic creation, a rôle for showing truth's transcendence. The apparent movement from one pole of reference to the other in the creation of an art-object is involved just in the expression of truth's transcendence and the art is successful insofar as this transcendence is caught and held. The Father of Logic believed that induction was the way up to the universal and deduction the way down from it and his analogy was drawn from the plastic arts where particularity seems to move to universality. But in the dynamic arts, on the contrary, the universal is the primitive with the particular the ideal goal. The two concepts of the universal are, of course, not the same. As ultimate the universal shows the highest significance, the attainment of a knowledge goal. As primitive it shows thought reduced to feeling-

status. To quote from a recent article I have written on this subject:

"... the melodic form of poetry is there by intent to throw into relief the particular significant experience, appearing only as meaning stripped to its most attenuated expression, that of the mood of the thought. Through their arrangement in rhythmic patterns, the poet's primitive materials, the elements of words, are given the relative significance of thought-forms or universals. And the juxtaposition of these forms with particular content gives in turn a new intensity to the meaning. Here, as in all the arts, we are asked to think on three levels at once: a foundation or substructure for meaning, on which appear a first and a second meaning-level, like the first and second stories of a house which are built successively over the original foundation. The house arrangement differs from that of the art-object just in the fact that the three levels are separated in the former but self-transcending in art."³

The poet, in short, has built up from a melodic sequence expressing the universal character of his thought by manipulation of syllables according to their number, quality, difference in intensity, duration, pitch, and so on, in order to obtain the cadence integral to his art; the sculptor, using marble for his basic material chose a particular human form, let us say, to represent universal humanity, and he builds to full comprehensiveness on a more and more significant particularity, just as the poet has striven for the adequate expression of a particular situation by the intensifying of universality as it appeared in relation to the particular incident he had in mind. Each artist testifies that the particular and the universal are inseparable, and that each is of equal importance in a truth situation.

³*The Universal-Particular Situation in Poetry and Sculpture*, *The Monist*, vol. xlv, p. 260.

III.

That the theory of life and the theory of knowledge are indissolubly bound up with one another was the great contention of Greek philosophy. Bergson, who has reached the same conclusion, has found it nevertheless necessary to go around knowledge instead of through it and by means of it, and for this reason his result can not claim the scientific basis demanded for proof of any problem whether in physics or metaphysics. The mysticism of Plotinus inspired by the Aristotelian *Actus Purus* which in its turn was derived from the famous picture of the Good as the spiritual sun of the universe has its feet planted firmly on epistemological ground. The Neo-Platonic picture is, on the one hand, a remarkable snapshot of the thinker at the moment of complete knowledge including the stages from ignorance through greater and greater understanding until the truth is achieved at last. On the other hand it is an ethical and religious representation of the activity of the world showing it as "the longing of matter after God." That a single truth in its progression from no thing to a *fait accompli* must involve a knower, first ignorant, then more and more informed, is apparent; and to the mind able to "go with the argument" all the way it leads, it is also apparent that the stages in learning process with progression from potentiality to actuality are equally implicative of the relation of human wills to the divine will. This has been the testimony of that "Greek intellectualism" which "never attained mysticism" according to the French intuitionist. However, the *Actus Purus* conception of the actuating Form, present not alone in the completed structure but with equal power appearing in all the animating forms throughout the ascending scale, must remain both intellectually and emotionally satisfactory because of its true representation of the

workings of the intellect. And by means of this insight into the mind's functioning, insight may be given into reality itself. Thus we can believe that our knowledge is in a Principle which not only gives us the capacity of knowing but makes us one with It in knowledge, and through this we can achieve the vision described by Plotinus which reveals indubitably that "while we walk the earth our summit is in the heavens."

ON THE WAY TO BABYLON

By KATE RANDLE MENESEE

To them, it is incredible
That I should never care
To wander with them down the stair
To Babylon—to Babylon.
They think how strange my life must be,
And barren, since I never see
Their Babylon—their Babylon.

When burnished stairs which they have trod
Are only shades of rust,
And gilded towers are wreaths of dust
In Babylon—in Babylon—
My sunlit hills shall dazzle me,
While ashes mark the tragedy
Of Babylon—of Babylon.

THE ULTRA-GOTHIC KANT

By F. C. S. SCHILLER

WHEN I take up the *Critique of Pure Reason* I always feel as though I were approaching one of the Wonders of the World, entering a Gothic cathedral, vast and venerable, reared at a prodigious cost of human ingenuity and labour, and now unfortunately fallen into a grievous state of decay. No wonder; for its site was badly chosen, not on the firm rock of a breezy hill-top, but in the foggy marshes of an unhealthy valley. Its foundations were insecure and badly laid. Its plan was not fully thought out in advance, but added to and modified as the work proceeded, very much at haphazard. It was built of materials of very unequal value, of the ruins of earlier buildings, of soft stone that disintegrated under the stress of wind and weather, of hard rocks that stand out among crumbling masses, of sheer rubble that the veriest jerry-builder should have shrunk from employing. Its taste is ultra-Gothic; every inch of its surface is laden with quaint, profuse and unmeaning ornament; but its gargoyles are superb. To complete its wreck its towers have been used as observation posts in a silly siege by warring tyrants, so it has suffered severely from bombardment. All this happened a hundred and fifty years ago; the building is hopelessly out of repair, and no longer fit to use. It is in short a ruin.

But it happens to be also a great national monument, and the chosen sanctuary of a great people. As such it is mentioned in all the guide books, and has become a noted place of pilgrimage. So we enter it with bated breath, hush the voice of criticism, and admire all we can.

I have described, very inadequately I fear, the mental attitude in which students of philosophy are trained to approach Kant's work. And I should be the last to deny that for some purposes this attitude is legitimate and salutary. But it may easily degenerate into idolatry and lend itself to nationalistic delusions. I suppose also that when I undertake the task of putting the whole truth about the *Critique* into the nutshell of a single article, I shall not be expected merely to summarize and praise, but rather to disport myself on a fine field for the iconoclast and the devil's advocate. The latter functionary, I would remind you, is an essential part of the Catholic machinery for making saints; he should always be heard also before a philosopher is deified and his doctrine is pronounced essential to salvation. I propose therefore to perform this vital function for Kant, conscientiously and not, I hope, unfairly.

Let us raise, however, a few preliminary questions before we attack the *Critique* itself. First, what was Kant trying to do in it? He was, of course, trying to be relevant to the situation in his subject, as he conceived it. Now at this time the field of philosophy was dominated by Hume, a great man of letters as well as a great philosopher, who had devastated the traditional schools by his demand to be shown an authentic example of the necessary connexions which were supposed to hold the universe together. The reverberations of Hume's bombshell had spread even to sleepy Königsberg, and roused Kant from his dogmatic slumber in the hot-bed of rationalism which academic Germany was then, as now.

Essentially the problem for conservative philosophers therefore was to find an answer to Hume, and Kant laboured at it faithfully for years. If he failed, it was be-

cause he had uncritically accepted too many of Hume's premisses, and that the conclusions he desired could not rest on them.

The next thing to grasp is that Kant's *Critique* belongs to a class of books the existence of which was brought home to me very early in my philosophic career. I had become the unsolicited recipient of a somewhat cranky work, written in a strange lingo, and had incautiously acknowledged it, with some comment on the language. The author accepted my suggestion of a glossary with enthusiasm, and speedily sent me a second edition, in which he explained that his first aim had been "to render his essay intelligible to himself". Hence, he continued, "the selection of such terms as *Architectonic Entelechy* and *Sensuous Entelechy*; they have been adopted in order to make the comprehension of the work less arduous". This artless confession I have ever since found to be a sovereign clue to the history of philosophy: it is full of works which may be suspected of a similar origin! It is most charitable therefore to suppose that the *Critique* also was written to render its author intelligible to himself. Unfortunately Kant did not equip it with a glossary or even an index; and the veneration for him is such that even after one hundred and fifty years it is still the rule for German editions of the *Critique* to have neither. But what is really wanted is a concordance!

A third point to state at the outset is the nature of Kant's bias. Every writer has a bias, and he usually conceals it, if he can. But Kant was not very skilful. His bias was evidently that of a naive rationalist, who revelled in technical terms, though he could never learn to handle them consistently, and who delighted in complex classifications

for their own sake. As Kemp Smith says (*Commentary* p. xxxii) he was "a rationalist by education, temperament and conviction", and Hume could not do more than disturb his slumber. The *Critique* is a consequence of the resulting nightmare. He had moreover a thoroughly Gothic mind, to which simplicity and classic clarity were utterly alien.

Fourthly, he had no literary talent, and his influence on philosophic writing has been entirely disastrous. He has probably ruined German as a vehicle of philosophic enlightenment, and spoilt the style of his admirers everywhere. And in view of the intrinsic difficulty of philosophic problems, that is surely a grave disservice to philosophy.

Now let us tackle some of the actual doctrines of the *Critique*. Kant's answer to Hume does not consist of confuting his arguments. He does not deny that necessary connexion is not an observable fact. He does not deny that it is an addition which, rightly or wrongly, the mind makes to the facts. Neither does he repudiate the presuppositions of Hume's psychology. Like Hume, he conceives the problem of knowledge to be that of connecting up atomic data by some principle of synthesis; for him also causality is a means of tying together into a bundle a series of discrete events. He has no idea, therefore, of repudiating Hume's atomistic psychology, and of taking causal analysis as a means of dissecting a continuous flow of experiences. In short he builds throughout on Hume's psychological basis. He stands and falls with Hume.

His answer to Hume consists merely of two things. He shows that Hume's account of knowledge was a failure. Now of this Hume himself had long been well aware. It had been the reason for his scepticism, and he could easily have shown that it doomed Kant's constructions to a similar

failure. Secondly, Kant showed that subjective additions to the given were not confined to the causal postulate. The mind's contributions to the working up of the object of knowledge were far more extensive. He elaborated them into an intricate system of *a priori* forms which were "the work of the mind" in constituting knowledge. Causation was merely one of twelve "categories". And besides categories there were other synthetic principles galore, Pure Forms of Perception, Space and Time, a Transcendental Ego or Synthetic Unity of Apperception, *plus* unavowed and uncriticized assumptions like the antitheses of Form and Matter, "pure" and empirical, phenomena and noumena, the absolute truth and finality of Formal Logic and of the mathematics of his time, the existence of Things-in-themselves and of Faculties.

To all this epistemological machinery he gave a perverse, obscure, misleading and ambiguous name, "the *a priori*." Until Kant an *a priori* argument had meant one that argued from cause to effect, and the apparently non-empirical factor in knowledge had been credited to the "innate idea". True, there had been some confusion as to how such ideas were inborn; but this confusion was only aggravated by Kant. The *a priori* became the central mystery of his system. It claimed to be logical, not chronological; but the *Transcendental Aesthetic* is full of passages which make no sense unless "priority" is understood as temporal.

And really Kant's whole enterprise was caught in a dilemma at this point. If the priority is taken temporally, the *a priori* reduces in principle to the innate idea, and, what is more, its existence becomes a question for *psychological* inquiry. Kant's new science of epistemology perishes still-

born. If the *a priori* is completely severed from all reference to the temporal order of events, then it is never psychic fact at all, but only a factor in a peculiar logical analysis, and a valuation which unjustly exalts it above an *a posteriori* which is no less indispensable. Moreover any such analysis must remain relative to the particular conceptions it chooses to set out from. Hence there may be any number of such analyses, and the choice between them can only be on *aesthetic* grounds. So there is no *a priori* necessity to prefer Kant's version of the *a priori* to any other.*

A further Kantian perversion of an older term is to be found in his use of the term 'category'. According to Kant a 'category' is a pure concept of the understanding imposed *a priori* on the matter of sensation and transforming it into a knowable object. He enumerates one dozen categories, all derived, very unconvincingly, from the forms of judgment, that is to say, really, of propositions; this process, with the aid of an equal number of temporal schemata and a portentously obscure transcendental deduction *a priori*, is supposed to guarantee both the applicability and the exhaustiveness of the classification. This last allegation however is glaringly false. Why, for instance, should causality be a category, and teleology not? The relation of means and end is surely just as legitimately employed to interpret events as that of cause and effect. Kant however relegates it as an afterthought to the *Critique of Judgment*. And a large number of Kant's favorite distinctions, like 'form' and 'matter', 'sensation' and 'thought', are used even by him just in the same way as 'categories', which as Kemp Smith remarks† he constantly mixes up with his 'schemata'. Not that their applicability is any guarantee of certainty.

* cf. *Axioms as Postulates*, 13-23.

† *Commentary*, p. 339.

'Causality' may be an *a priori* conception, but this in no wise helps us to assign the *right* 'cause' to any given 'effect': in every science the scientist has to take the responsibility for the *choice* of a suitable category and to observe the empirical consequences of his choice.

Another tantalizing feature in Kantian terminology is its systematic ambiguity. There is not a technical term in the whole *Critique* which does not have at least two meanings! My time will permit me to mention only one notorious case; but it occurs very early, and concerns a very vital point. In his *Introduction* Kant makes much of the contention that although all knowledge begins *with* experience, it does not arise *from* experience. But he does not seem to have noticed that he is using 'experience' in two very different senses. The first 'experience' means experience as understood by Kantian apriorism, viz. as composed of empirical data, formed by 'categories' into objects; the second means experience as it seemed to an empiricist like Hume. And the whole dictum states how Kant thought he had improved on Hume. But, alas, these were not the sole alternatives. Both were only theories about an underlying 'experience' as it psychologically *is* for the ordinary man. This too perhaps is not a primitive *datum*; but it has at least gained authority by growing up in the course of ages, and developing pragmatic value. In any case, it seems very desirable to distinguish clearly between the common sense experience which is given as the *explicandum* and the philosophic endeavors to interpret it.

The greatest and most fundamental *crux* which the student of the *Critique* encounters is perhaps that known as the problem of the Thing-in-itself. It arises thus. After it has been laid down that the antithesis between a *posteri-*

ori and *a priori* can be developed from that between the *datum* and the work of the mind, and ultimately reduced to that between Matter and Form, a number of questions still remain unanswered. How does the Form form the matter? Why does the Matter submit to be formed? Must there not be a sort of pre-established harmony between them which transcends their dualism? None of these questions has any obvious answer on Kantian principles. But the difficulties they involve are child's play compared with those which arise when a further question is put to Kant. The fatal question '*whence the matter of experience which is formed by the mind?*' Kant was not idealist enough to answer by alleging that it too was created by the mind; so he answered 'it comes from the thing itself', taken apparently in the good old realistic way as that which underlies appearances to us.

But having made this realistic postulate, Kant proceeded to whittle it away. The thing itself could never be known, because every object of knowledge must be permeated by the work of the mind. So, though it was necessary to hold *that* it existed (if Kant's theory was to stand), it was impossible to say *what* it was. This corollary was very stimulating: it was enough for a generation after Kant to set every philosophy professor in Germany guessing at the *Thing-in-itself*, and trying to find a way of lifting Kant's taboo. It would have been more logical but much less fun, to point out into what troubles the Thing-in-itself plunged as Kant's argument proceeded. Since he had insisted that objects of thought must be categorized, and that the categories sprang *a priori* from the mind by a sort of virgin birth, they could not be applicable to the Thing-in-itself, which provided the matter of experience. It was not possible, therefore, to speak of the Thing-in-itself without us-

ing the category of *Unity*, nor of Things-in-themselves without the aid of the category of *Plurality*, nor to regard it as the *cause* of phenomena without the sanction of the causal category, nor even to assume its existence without recourse to the category of *Substance*. Clearly if the Thing-in-itself was to continue to figure in the Kantian doctrine, an extensive 'transcendent' use of the categories must be permitted. Yet how could that be? Had not Kant expressly and vigorously forbidden just this expedient? And could he withdraw this prohibition without giving up the Critical philosophy's whole claim to supersede dogmatic metaphysics? In short, the Thing-in-itself had involved Kant in inextricable confusion and flagrant contradiction. It was no wonder that his younger contemporary, F. H. Jacobi (1743-1819) could sum up the situation very neatly by remarking "Without the Thing-in-itself I cannot get into Kant's philosophy: with it, I cannot stay there!"

I have endeavored, so far, to make clear a few of the major defects that vitiate Kant's work; but I am now seized with a fear lest I should have overshot my mark. I may have led you to despair of understanding Kant, and to wonder how a writer who has committed all the literary and logical atrocities with which he is charged, could ever have risen so high in the ranks of famous philosophers and have become a pivotal character in European thought. I feel therefore that it is incumbent upon me to explain why and to what extent these inferences need to be qualified.

First, as for understanding Kant, I am convinced that no one has ever achieved this completely. No one has ever assimilated Kant so completely that he could swallow *all* the things that Kant has maintained. Not even Kant himself, who had a curious knack of preserving, like flies in amber,

old trains of thought which he had long outgrown at the time his book was published, and who never took the trouble of revising his manuscript to make sure that it expressed a consistent view. To illustrate this habit, Professor Adickes has pretty well proved that one particularly obscure line of thought arose simply from an accidental transposition of a couple of pages in Kant's manuscript.

Clearly with an author of this kind one must be a good deal more Kantian than Kant to flatter oneself that one can find consistency in Kant and swallow him whole. What in fact all the various sorts of Kantians have done is to compile a credible Kant, a Kant they can believe in, by judiciously selecting the passages and doctrines which fit in with their general view, and to ignore what does not. The whole material no one could possibly accept, and the minute criticism of the modern 'Kant-philologists' has conclusively shown that not even Kant ever held simultaneously all that he published together. Taken in the mass the stuff is simply a vast muddle; and if by 'understanding' one means to take it all in as it stands, then no one can understand Kant without reliving his mental history and getting into *the same* muddle! But if by 'understanding Kant' is meant analyzing his reasonings, noting his ambiguities and hesitations, detecting his mistakes, unravelling his confusions—then 'understanding Kant' means reaching a higher critical level than ever Kant himself attained.

Now this may well be a possible achievement; but it does not seem likely that the quickest and easiest *route* to such critical understanding should lie through the jungle of the Kantian literature. Rather we shall be inclined to accept William James's great dictum that the best way to a truly critical philosophy leads, not *through* Kant, but *round* him!

Or, more specifically, why not let us start our critical epistemology further back, with Locke? Locke has got the idea of a critical inquiry into knowledge quite as clear as Kant: he is much less complicated; and from Locke it is easy to go back to common-sense and to appreciate its pragmatic value. That will enable us to understand that knowing is not merely an intellectual parlor game, but a really vital activity, and that its various stages are to be understood primarily with reference to its purpose. So we shall finally arrive at a far more adequate theory of knowledge which is founded, not upon the abstractions and fictions of the traditional intellectualism, but upon the unmutilated, integral functions, the needs, aims, and ideals of the whole man.

The indisputable fact that in spite of its logical defects Kantian philosophy has proved a great terminus from which a great variety of trains of thought have taken their departure, is not really the paradox it seems. To an observant student of the history of philosophy it should occasion no surprise. It is only a case of a phenomenon which has occurred over and over again. It is *not* the more consistent systems that are the most stimulating. It is rather those whose inconsistencies are sufficiently obvious and appear to be fairly superficial, that inspire others with the ambition of removing them and setting them right. A perfectly consistent and clean-cut system would not challenge emendation. As with an indisputable objection, there is nothing more to be said about it. You must take it or leave it: for it leads on to nothing beyond itself. Fortunately, perhaps, no such perfect system has yet been devised to adorn, and close, the history of philosophy! On the other hand, a thoroughly ambiguous, inconsistent and incoherent system, which tries to hold together and to unite a variety of di-

vergent lines of thought, is capable of development in many directions. Hence it attracts disciples, each of whom imposes his own peculiar interpretation on it, and starts his own development, with vigorous polemics all the time against his fellow-disciples, as to which is the right interpretation of their common master, so soon as he is dead.

It is for this reason that Socrates, who had not committed himself by anything on paper, and therefore could say what he liked on each occasion to each of his admirers, has been such a prolific founder of 'Socratic' schools. Not only the Platonic, but also the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Megarian school could claim Socratic inspiration, and puzzle us with their divergences. Similarly Locke's sensible compromise between rationalism and empiricism cried out for development, as did Descartes's artificial and unstable adjustment between the claims of spirit and matter. Plato also has proved such a perennial fount of philosophic inspiration, just because no one could turn his dialogues into a single system. Hegel could enlist an army of disciples just because no one could tell from his cryptic and ambiguous utterances whether the innermost *nisus* of his system led it to the right or to the left. On the other hand, the systems which have been relatively consistent have been poor in developments. Who can remember the disciples of Hobbes, or Schopenhauer, or Nietzsche, and the developments they effected? Aristotelianism was so complete that Aristotle's followers soon dwindled into insignificance; it revived only when it was grafted on to the thoroughly alien body of Christian dogma. Berkeley's system could lead only towards Hume, but by an illegitimate development.

Now the Kantian system certainly lent itself to a great variety of interpretations. It could be interpreted realisti-

cally or idealistically or sceptically, logically or psychologically or metaphysically, rationalistically or voluntaristically, or even, I almost blush to say it, pragmatically. Moreover all these interpreters can make out a case. They can all quote, quite adequately and even abundantly, from the master's words for their interpretations; and can dispute, endlessly, about the relative importance of their various quotations. There cannot be any finality, therefore, about Kantian exegesis. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is eminently one of the books of which it is true that *Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque, Invenit ac pariter dogmata quisque sua*.

From this point of view Kantian philosophy seems a great open-air mine, in which any one may quarry, according to his taste. Many will get only rubbish out of it—the wherewithal to feed their pedantries—and tricky questions with which to trip up and torment examines. But there is also some precious ore there, which it may pay to extract when the labour costs are not too high. A pity only that the ore should be so recalcitrant, and that the rock in which it is embedded should be so tough and hard to work!

PERSONALITY, THE DYNAMIC OF RELIGION

By HERBERT A. YOUTZ

IN the striking words of Baron von Hügel, "There are two great world-moving experiences of the human race; Christianity and Scientific Method." There are two great human experiences in which men discover their mastery over life. These are the experience of mechanical energy and the experience of spiritual energy.

Today we are living under the spell of science and its amazing accomplishments. The world-moving experience of scientific method is the experience of dealing quantitatively and mechanically with energy. Science is the experience of weighing and measuring, of analysis and synthesis, of process and behavior and growth and their laws. The biological sciences describe the living world as a vast organism. Physical science describes the world as an harmonious mechanical system. The world behaves like a vast machine of inexhaustible energy.

Science is truly a form of experience which is world-moving and world-transforming. Time would fail me to tell of motor inventions, of electric light and power, of telephones, cinemas, radios, X-rays and a thousand miracles of the "microbe hunters" in controlling health and life itself. Our Edisons and Pasteurs are the heroes of our civilization. Little wonder that under the spell of scientific accomplishment we are forming a civilization which is strongly inclined to believe that science dealing with the titanic forces of the natural world, holds the key to the understanding of the ultimate problems of human life!

But there is another world-moving experience of the human race. The experience of dealing with the spiritual

and moral energies of personal life is not less significant for the race than is science. It was a distinguished physicist, Robert A. Millikan, addressing a group of scientists upon the subject of the greatness of scientific achievement, who said:

“There are two things of immense importance in this world, two ideas or beliefs upon which, in the last analysis, the weal or woe of the race depends. I do not say that belief in the possibilities of scientific progress is the most important. The most important thing in the world is a belief in the reality of moral and spiritual values.”

In religious experience men deal with reality, not quantitatively but qualitatively. Religion deals with values, not with size. It deals with the meaning of life, not with methods. It deals with worth, not with weight. Religion deals not with spatial depths of life but with spiritual depths. It deals with the dynamic purposes and motives of men and seeks to discover life's intrinsic goals and fundamental ends. It believes that spiritual motivation of life is an energy more significant for civilization than all titanic mechanical energies. The experience of Christianity is based upon the experimental, world-moving discovery of Jesus, shared and verified in the lives of a great multitude. “Christianity is a revelation of the altogether unsuspected depth and inexhaustibleness of human personality,” says von Hügel. In dealing with the deep interior experiences of personal life, we are dealing with the dynamic energies of the universe. For this is a spiritual universe.

Here is the epic human struggle, the struggle of contending philosophies of life. Materialism is that type of philosophic belief based upon the supremacy of the mechanical energies of the external world. Idealism is that type of philosophic belief based upon the supremacy of the in-

terior idealizing energies of the human mind. For religious leadership, the tragedy of the age-old struggle between materialism and idealism is that in our twentieth century civilization the battle seems to be going strongly against the defenders of religious faith. There are those who declare that there is an irrepressible conflict between scientific experience and religious experience. In the confusion and bewilderment which surround religion today, what can we do to transform the defeat into a forward movement? How can we contribute to religious progress in an age of scientific progress? What are the invincible resources of dynamic religion?

The answer to that question is the solution which has been urged by every great prophet of the spirit, — the re-discovery, experimentally, of “the unsuspected depth and inexhaustibleness of human personality, and of man’s access to God.” It is the true dimensions of human experience that is in question. Any adequate theory of society must recognize the profound significance for the race of its inner spiritual development. It is in cultivating these profounder experiences of the mind that the limitations of mechanism are seen. It is in living with our whole lives that materialism is refuted. In scientific experience the laws of mechanism are discovered; while in religious experience the supremacy of mind over mechanism is demonstrated. Religion and science are two harmonious aspects of the mind’s experience. For religion, like science, is founded upon “the nature of things.”

In an admirable address not long ago upon the achievements of science, the speaker twice repeated impressively and exultantly, “We scientists are seeking for the truth!” We who are laboring for spiritual betterment and deeper

spiritual understanding must not be terrified by the tone of scientific presumption! We too are seeking for the truth. We believe that the experience of ethical religion affirming the supremacy of the spiritual values of human life, is more significant for the race than the accomplishments of science. There is courage in that conviction. We are seeking for the truth.

As men rise in the scale of experience, their needs become spiritual needs, the urge for help drives them to cry out for spiritual help from an individual God. For the worship of every age is determined by the mental and spiritual experience of that age. When we pray to the God who is the Heavenly Father, we are repeating in the highest forms that we know the baby's instinctive search for nourishment in the first hours of his life. Developed prayer is a biological necessity for the needs of the highest spiritual experience, just as the first faint cry of the child was a biological necessity. That is, religion and prayer and God begin where life begins, though they do not come to spiritual expression until life is cultivated into spiritual development. Religion begins as blind instinct; but it ends as purpose and vision and friendship and love. It looks as though the Author of Life is the author of that urge which drives mankind to seek help in need. Help is as near to the man who prays as the mother is to her child. God is as near to us as life! He is Life. Vital religion is laying hold of Him as fullness of Life. This is the biological parable of religion. Living religion must be a growing religion. Dynamic religion is a developing experience of reality, not a static creed.

Thus its biological origin and growth help us to an understanding of religion. Religion is the developing expression of a man's growing sense of need and the urge which drives him to satisfy his need by making connection with

higher powers. It begins in the satisfaction of organic animal needs, but it develops into a power to deal with a man's highest spiritual needs. Thus religion is a man's search for God and developed prayer is communion with Him.

The same truth of a man's need and its satisfaction is more adequately expressed by saying that religion is an art. Art is a creative activity of the mind

"performed by an effort of the will in response to some felt need, and the man who thus fashions some new thing is an artist. In its essence and widest scope art is the creation of something new in response to some felt need of the body or of the spirit. The man who builds a house to shelter his family is as truly an artist as he who paints a picture or sings a song in response to the need of his soul. In all the wide range of creation from the pioneer hut to the city's cathedral, from the rude scratches on the cave walls of prehistoric man to the sublime works of a Michelangelo, or from the folk songs of a tribal feast to Beethoven's Symphony in A, we have the creative spirit in man responding to his need."*

The primitive man builds a crude religion chiefly to satisfy his bodily needs. The developed man builds religion as a sanctuary to satisfy his complex spiritual needs. His religion is the creative expression of his spiritual needs and their satisfaction. His religion is his supreme work of art, his poem, his beautiful creation where he meets God. It is his sacred and costliest offering. A civilized man's religion is much more akin to poetry than it is to science. For great religions grow out of man's experience of the beauty and worth and meaning of life. It is a product of the creative imagination dealing with spiritual values. It expresses his highest, ultimate vision of reality, and therefore it is truth. Great religion is a structure of creative faith,

**Creative Religious Literature*, Arthur J. Culler, p. 1.

not a discovery of science. It grows out of man's finest appreciations, not his descriptive explanations.

It is the distinction of prophetic teaching that it appeals to undeveloped capacities of experience and bids men to utilize their neglected energies. A physician finds a man who is leading a feeble and limited life because his lung power or heart action are hindered. He is able to remove the limitation and bring heart and lungs back to health and vigor. He makes a "new man" of the patient. When certain glands are diseased or undeveloped it sometimes has a fearful effect upon a man's mood and mentality. If a cure can be effected, it transforms the life of the patient and brings back the experience of hope and buoyancy and happiness and effectiveness.

Jesus, prophet of ethical religion, spoke of His own ministry as directed to the cure of souls. They that are whole need no physician, but they that are sick. He came that man might have abounding life. His diagnosis of human need led to the discovery that men are not living complete lives. They are not living in the depths but on the surface. This explains the anemia and futility and unhappiness of life. The cure can be effected only in developing the neglected and unused areas which every man has within himself. The release of these powers brings abounding life and health and joy.

Jesus' diagnosis revealed two functional failures; religious failure and moral failure. His prescription for the cure of society was directed to two ends; first, to deepening their experience of human worth; Second, to deepening man's trust in God. His whole Gospel expresses the conviction that ethical religion is the great regenerative energy

that the world needs, the radical remedy for the radical failure of human society.

One cannot doubt that Jesus Himself saw the world as alive with God, a world where men live and work in an invisible Presence, a world where the will of God is everywhere and inevitably a fact. The Presence of God was a reality to Him just as much as the presence of energy and law are physical realities to us. It requires no argument to convince men that the world, for Jesus, was alive with God, and not a mere dead machine. We may say that He was mistaken, that He lived under an illusion. But that He lived with the consciousness of an invisible person with whom He held communion, whose Will was the source of His courage, his power, his wisdom, his joy, — no one can question the genuineness and constancy of his God-consciousness. He had the confidence of a son looking up into the face of his father. "This is the abundant life," he once said, as He spoke to the invisible Presence, — "This is eternal life, to know thee."

You cannot doubt that Jesus created a new type of experience of God in the disciples whom He gathered about Him and whom He taught to pray to the Father God. The new spirit of heroism that filled the disciples after Jesus was gone; the new church starting on its conquering way; the new exaltation and nobility and courage and power that were so conspicuous in the earlier centuries, in the face of persecutions and martyrdoms which made even their enemies marvel; — these all are the witnesses of history to the phenomenal fullness of life which characterized early Christian experience.

And throughout the less heroic centuries that have followed, a multitude of individuals have followed Christ in

the heroic way because of their vision of the world as God's which Jesus had so indelibly impressed upon the minds of His followers. Even the crusades of the Middle Ages, undertaken in His name, so pitifully useless and wasteful, were yet a demonstration of the tremendous heroic motives generated in the lives of men, women and children, by that slogan "God wills it." The student of history is driven irresistibly to the conviction that the Christian Church is based upon the human capacity for God and upon faith in God coöperating in human affairs.

The Christian religion is founded upon Jesus' conception that this is a spiritual universe, alive with God. In the language of science, this is the hypothesis with which a Christian experiments with life. Christian experience of God is the verifying of the Christian hypothesis. God manifests Himself as Help, Power, Presence, Inspiration, Companionship. We discover that this is a spiritual world which can be trusted to sustain the venture of faith. Dr. Charles E. Jefferson finely says that "Faith is the act of counting on the Invisible to accomplish the impossible."

Jesus' Social Gospel centers in his Gospel of human worth. The infinite worth of the soul is the characteristic teaching of Jesus. John Cowper Powys says, "The profoundest of the great Christian dogmas, that dogma which more than any other we owe directly to Christ, is the startling doctrine of the immeasurable and equal value of every living soul." Christian ethics is based upon the worth and sacredness of human life. Since human values constitute the supreme worth, the service of humanity is the great sacred task. It is this reverence for personality that makes all exploitation of persons the deadly sin. We cannot wrong human beings without degrading ourselves.

The supremacy of human values and the sacredness of human relations are our principles of social conduct. Men and women and children must be treated as true ends of life, and never as means to selfish ends.

Jesus' doctrine of the worth and sacredness of humanity is revolutionary when you apply it to conduct. Its application would outlaw war and cure most of the social evils and heal the festering hates and envies and jealousies. These are things that are crippling and debasing and destroying society today.

"We regard the use of the body for base ends as prostitution. By what name shall we call the prostitution of other human powers to serve selfish ends? A man who exploits personality is an enemy of mankind, an enemy of God. Christian ethics can countenance no social order that is blind to the sacredness of persons. It can endorse no industrialism or capitalism or socialism that puts a market value upon personality or hinders the free development of the spirit. Persons are intrinsic ends of life, not means to our own selfish ends.

Ethical religion is a call to coöperation with God in building a civilization in which there is no difference among men in their common humanity. Unity and peace and the sacredness of the whole human brotherhood are postulates of a Kingdom of God built upon human worth."*

There is a deep undercurrent of dissatisfaction and protest today against the brilliant, empty, secular civilization that we are forming. Our wisest leaders and critics are warning us that our civilization is slipping. It is not founded upon rock bottom. It is not rational. There is a note of discontent and longing that arise sometimes above

*Affirmations of Christian Belief, H. A. Youtz, p. 56.

the voice of our superficial, new-rich age of smug content. The peril of our civilization is that we shall stifle that prophetic note and lose all sense of life's true values.

There is widespread dismay today at the easy immorality of our age, violating the home life, destroying ideals of honesty and of honor, filling our places of judgment and of trust with men who can be bought, stalking through our civilization in the form of violence and crime and vice. The disintegration of morality is the great threatening problem that faces social leadership. We seem to be losing our sense of values! We are losing our sense of God. We are losing the joy of life!

There is no way of manipulating economic values and political values to organize an ideal social order. Harry Ward has the insight of a prophet in arraigning "Our Economic Morality." We need spiritual convictions more than we need scientific progress. No League of Nations can establish peace and security. No world peace can be organized into being; peace is a human value that must be cultivated from within. Men must be changed before society can be stabilized. Jesus was right. The remedy must be applied at the sources of human life, where men deal with religious and moral values. These are the forces that vitalize a sterile society.

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION

By ANNA FORBES LIDDELL

RELIGION affirms an immediate, personal experience of the ultimate reality which philosophy searches in a never ending quest. Faith assumes more than knowledge can hope ever to attain. To one who is deeply grounded in religious conviction, philosophical enquiry must seem tainted with a skepticism, and, on the other hand, the uncriticised sureness of that very conviction will appear to the philosopher as unwarranted, even a little absurd. Thus there appears to be a fundamental, irreconcilable difference between philosophy and religion, although the two are alike in that they, and they only among the manifold activities of the human spirit, undertake to solve the whole problem of existence and value, finite being and its infinite implication. The difference between the two has sometimes been explained by describing the one approach as emotional, the other as rational, but as we tend more and more to deny that there is any clean cut distinction between faculties of the mind, this explanation becomes artificial and unsatisfactory. Neither should we overlook the fact that the religious devotee always maintains that he *knows*, whereas the philosopher is likely to protest that he himself could never *feel* so certain.

Again it is sometimes made to appear that the chief difference between philosophy and religion is a difference in terminology. Where philosophy says the One, the Absolute, the Infinite; religion says God. As religion finds salvation for the soul, philosophy integrates the individual in the ultimate scheme of reality. But, if we study the terminology carefully, we find that exact parallelism is not

maintained. Religious experience always has an intensely personal aspect. Even if, as in the chief oriental religions, man's ultimate salvation is the annihilation of his separate identity, yet he attains to this state, achieves the blessedness of being absorbed into the Absolute, through his own efforts. There are philosophical theories, however, in which man seems to lose his personal significance entirely. For example, Hume said, "The identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one."¹

Hume did not deny, of course, that there is a subjective aspect to experience, but it remained for Kant to show that this pure *I*, the indefinable, indemonstrable, subjective accompaniment of experience of phenomena, is also, necessarily, the noumenal object or focal unity without which moral and religious life were impossible. Centuries earlier, St. Augustine had affirmed that knowledge of God is attained through inner self-reflection. Jesus of Nazareth—and one does not have to be a Christian in order to recognize him as one of the great religious teachers of the world—is quoted as having said: "Ye believe in God; believe also in me."

I submit that this consciousness of the self as an original, complete, and continuous unity capable of receiving experience and translating it into value is one essential characteristic of religion. Although many great philosophers have made the reality of self the central thought of their speculative theories (for example, Fichte), it is possible to develop a philosophy without it. Hume has already been cited as an instance, and in our own time Professor Ralph Barton Perry has inveighed against "the Ego-centric

¹ *Treatise of Human Nature*, Part IV, Section VI. Everyman Edition, p. 239.

Predicament”² of idealists. But without ego-centricity is religious experience possible?

It may be objected that among primitive peoples and even those of higher culture, religion has appeared as a tribal, racial, or group expression rather than as an inner, personal experience. But is not the individual man as such also social? His relationships in society are not artificial but natural. His very self is social. The consciousness of discrete, isolated personality emerges gradually after long centuries of civilized sophistication, and even then the normal person can never separate himself and his own experience absolutely from his kind. If this be true, the social expressions of religion do not contradict the statement that self-consciousness is basic to religion. Rather, insofar as a man finds self-realization in social relationships he will manifest his deepest self-consciousness, his religion, in social form. He expresses himself in the common life, and religion is the very reality of that life.

In brief, the religious man takes himself seriously as the agent of reality, and I profess that any man who sees himself in this relation, whether or not he admit any creed, follow any cult, or make use of any form of expression conventionally termed religious, is essentially a religious man. And if it be said that in that case every man must be at least occasionally, even if not consistently, religious, I should admit that he is.

The importance of self in religious experience, however, is derived from the essential connection with ultimate reality, God. One of the great figures in the Christian Religion, St. Paul, said: “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves, but

² *Journal of Philosophy—Psychology, etc.*, 1910. 7, 5—14.

our sufficiency is of God.”³ Is not this the characteristic attitude? Such living transcends the customary level of human existence. Those who regard themselves as dedicated to God may follow some special pattern of behavior, as appears in monastic orders or other special rules of discipline, or they may continue in the ways of ordinary folk, but in either case the regular business of life becomes symbolic of a deeper value. Life for them is more than life. It is the way to God; symbolically at least, it may become the very way *of* God.

In every religion, belief in God is the working hypothesis of life. His existence or eternal reality is necessary from the beginning; without God nothing were possible. There is, therefore, no need to establish the truth of his reality. When proofs of the existence of God are offered, theology has made its appearance, and theology is the effort to use philosophy in the service of religion. Philosophy questions all. If it affirms the eternal unity, the absolute One or God, there must be logical justification for the affirmation. Many, perhaps the greatest, among philosophers have maintained that such absolute unity, or God, is, but there are also the materialists, the skeptics, and the atheists whose honest enquiries have reached a far different conclusion. In the field of philosophy, place must be allowed for “*Den Geist, der stets verneint*,”⁴ but religion is essentially positive; there is no room for him there.

And here we come to what I believe to be the essential difference between the two. Because philosophy is speculative, it can contain its own negation; every theory can be matched by a contrary theory, and all remain philosophical, but the opposite of religion is absence of religion.

³ Corinthians II, Chapter 3, v. 5.

⁴ Goethe, *Faust*, Part I, 1, 1338.

Thus, abstractly considered, philosophy seems the broader term. Religious creeds and ideas appear to be special branches of philosophy. But actually, religion has the wider reach. Whoever speaks of philosophical experience? Philosophy is interpretation of life, but religion is the spiritual quality of real living — life immediately self-conscious of its own meaning. Its truth is not discovered through speculation or demonstration; it is manifested and enjoyed.

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO SCIENCE

By DELO C. GROVER

THE ideal which it is desired to hold up for our recognition and acceptance may be stated thus, *Modern Philosophy and Modern Science, one and inseparable!*

One important trend of thought in our time is seen in the evident softening of many group antagonisms, misunderstandings and confusions which have filled so large a place in the thinking of the past, even the quite recent past. Professor Patrick speaks of a very marked convergence which is manifesting itself in our time. This is illustrated in recent discussions of Rationalism and Empiricism. The difference between Idealism and Naturalism are being lessened by our newer knowledge of matter and our newer conception of mind. Our recent thinking is marked by a decided humanistic emphasis.

"In recent years this humanistic aspect of philosophy, this attempt to interpret life, to see things in the large, to gain the right perspective, has been emphasized much more than the older metaphysical problems, such as the nature of reality, of God, and the world. In the philosophy of the present we hear a great deal about life and the self and evolution and the pragmatic values¹."

As illustrating the common ground worked over by science and philosophy, we have the writings of such men as S. Alexander with a book entitled, "*Space, Time, and Deity*"; Eddington with a book entitled, "*Space, Time, and Gravitation*." Eddington quotes H. Minkowski as saying,

"The views of Time and Space, which I have set forth, have their foundation in experimental physics. Therein is their strength. Their tenden-

¹ G. W. Patrick: Introduction to Philosophy; Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1924, p. 6.

cy is revolutionary. From henceforth space in itself and time in itself sink to mere shadows, and *only a kind of union of the two preserves an independent existence*’.”

The point of great interest to me is the fact that in these and other works by Einstein, Eddington, Alexander, Minkowski, Bergson, Lloyd Morgan, Patton, and many others, science and philosophy are indeed “one and inseparable”—one in ultimate aim and essential method.

While it is quite possible and genuinely useful to fence off special fields for human inquiry and to devise special techniques for the carrying forward of investigation within such special fields, it yet remains true that complete knowledge, even of the facts lying within those fields, can never be realized independently or their inter-relations both with other special fields and also with the *realm of reality as a whole*. I can do no more than call attention to this significant truth of comprehensive inter-relationships in this paper. Such titles as these which have appeared in our generation are illustrative of my thesis: “*Man’s Place in the Universe*,” by Alfred Russell Wallace; “*Natural Law in Science and Philosophy*,” by Boutroux; “*The Philosophy of Biology*,” by James Johnstone; “*The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*,” being the Gifford Lectures by Hans Driesch; “*Darwinism Today*,” by Vernon L. Kellogg; “*The New Rationalism*,” by E. G. Spalding; “*Emergent Evolution*,” by C. Lloyd Morgan, and a great list of others.

All of these scientist-philosophers and philosopher-scientists find themselves essentially driven to postulate some reality which transcends mechanical formulation, some creative agency which represents some other, and

² A. S. Eddington: *Space, Time and Gravitation*, Cambridge University Press, 1920, p. 30.

over-plus, beyond the elements found within the special fields of scientific observation. The following is by no means exceptional in present day thinking:

“To explain evolution, to explain creative synthesis, to explain organization all the way up the ladder, to explain life, perhaps even to explain matter, we seem to need to make the postulate of some creative energy. . . . Such a creative agency has, of course, been postulated in every religious system of the world and in most of the philosophical systems; but here we are trying to work out the problem from a biological point of view. Probably many biologists will simply say that this subject belongs to metaphysics and is outside the sphere of strict science. But there is no such sharp demarcation nowadays between philosophy and science. They are getting to be one in purpose and interest. The biologist is becoming more and more a philosopher, and the philosopher a biologist, and as for the creative agency, or organizing principle, the biologist must either find a way to get along without it, or at least wonder what it is.”

The Purpose of Science

“The ultimate purpose of science” is being defined as “the prediction and control of events.” The truth should be stressed that the prediction and control of events is the ultimate purpose of every science. The purpose of the science of Human Psychology is the prediction and control of human activities.

In every science we must begin with certain tentative definitions, principles, hypotheses or theories. It is observed, touching the use and value of theories, that

“theories, like definitions, are working hypotheses. . . . Facts, without theories behind them, with no way of organizing and relating them,

³ Patrick, *Introduction to Philosophy*, 97, 98.

⁴ R. H. Wheeler: *The Science of Psychology*, Crowell, N. Y., 1929, p. 8.

would lead to nothing new. Under these circumstances progress in science would be impossible⁵."

Woodworth offers this definition as a working hypothesis: "Psychology is a scientific study of the activities of the individual." He clarifies the subject further by saying "Psychology takes the individual as a whole and describes his activities."

Some psychologists, on the basis of a structural analysis would explain the organism, or the individual as a whole, by reference to its parts. The parts, as elements or entities, when added together, are supposed to make up the individual. But it is not too much to say with Professor Wheeler,⁶

"The person who holds that the whole can be explained by its parts or predicted from its parts is a mechanist. Science is abandoning mechanistic theories because they leave too many facts unexplained."

Just what is the relation of a whole to its parts? I quote again from Wheeler:

"Scientists have sometimes assumed that the whole could be explained in terms of its parts, but this is not true because the *whole is more than the sum of its parts*."

It is this "whole," which is always "more than the sum of its parts," the activities of which become the object of the study of the scientist. The ultimate purpose of every science is the prediction and control of the activities of that "whole" or organism-as-a-whole, or individual-as-a-whole, which is thus always more than the sum of its parts. Wheeler closes this part of his discussion as follows:⁷

"Now the human being as a unified, organized

⁵ id. p. 10.

⁶ id. pp. 16-17.

⁷ id. pp. 17-18.

whole, exhibits such activities as seeing, feeling, and thinking. It makes no difference whether or not we call these activities mental. As scientists we are not interested in the question whether these are activities of a mind. It is sufficient to know that they are activities of the human organism, as a whole, intact being, a being which can not be explained in terms of dissected parts."

A further question which I ask the reader to consider at this time concerns the cause of the variety of schools or types of philosophy. What seems to be a confusing variety in the brands of philosophy which compete for our consideration and adoption causes many persons to turn away from philosophy altogether. This objection however is not justified. The objection is itself the outcome of misunderstanding.

Philosophy is in all cases a way of looking at things in their relations to some whole of things. It is a way of looking at things in the large. Different schools or types of philosophy are different ways of looking at things in their relations to the whole of reality or in the large. In truth and ultimate purpose, philosophy always makes use of the material of experience, and always seeks to understand, interpret, predict and control experience. This is true in varying degrees of all philosophies, and not less so of the special sciences — chemistry, physics, biology, anthropology, agriculture and the like.

As compared with philosophy, science gives more attention to description and less to interpretation and evaluation. As compared with science, philosophy gives greater attention to interpretation and evaluation and less to description. The ultimate purpose, however, of both philosophy and science is one, namely — the prediction and control of human experience. Every philosophy springs out of

experience and is tested by experience. Experience, as here conceived, is never made up of an aggregation of elements or little entities, mental or physical or formal, but it is always the functioning of the unitary individual.

Present day philosophy is finding more than ordinary significance in the definiteness with which many psychologists, ignoring some old problems as irrelevant, are going directly to the *individual-as-a-whole* for the explanation of experience-activities. Functional, Dynamic, Gestalt or configurational psychology, as represented by an increasing number of workers in the field of psychology today, makes little account of the old problem of the relationship between the "mind" entity and the "body" entity. One of these psychologists remarks:⁸

"Strange as it may seem the physicist has not found matter and the psychologist has not found mind. Instead, both groups of scientists have been discovering different sorts of events that are reducible in a last analysis to a common set of laws. . . . The problem of the relationship between "mind" and "body" is irrelevant to the purpose of analyzing and controlling human behavior."

And now, let me again refer to the thesis with which this paper was begun, *Philosophy and Science, one and inseparable*. It is the conviction of an increasing number of present day scientists and philosophers that the tasks of these groups of workers are co-operative. They are not mutually antagonistic but mutually supplementary.

The worker in philosophy has no greater obligation to be pious, idealist or spiritual than has the worker in any of the special sciences, nor has he any right to be less a lover of facts or less vigorous in the pursuit of truth and reality than those who labor in any of the sciences.

⁸ id. p. 19.

An adequate appreciation of this co-operative and co-ordinate relationship between philosophy and the special sciences is crucially important in the developing of a well-proportioned curriculum in a Liberal Arts College course of study. The ranking of philosophy and the sciences in a well-rounded course of study should be strictly co-ordinate. Philosophy is undoubtedly the pre-eminently orienting discipline in a Liberal Arts course of study. A useful figure of speech is easily suggested from the inter-relationship existing between the States of our Nation and between the Federal Government and the States. The jurisdiction of philosophy is like that of the Federal Government. It in no way infringes upon the jurisdiction of the special sciences. These are supreme within their respective fields. The jurisdiction of philosophy is general and comprehensive. The jurisdiction of the sciences lies within their special fields.

CURRENT THOUGHT

Twenty Years After

The twentieth anniversary of the passing of Josiah Royce is recalled by an illuminating article entitled "Josiah Royce — Twenty Years After," by Professor Julius Seelye Bixler in the July issue of the *Harvard Theological Review*.

Professor Bixler discusses the enduring elements in Royce's philosophy at a time when the Roycean absolutism seems to be most in eclipse. His conclusion is that there is permanent religious value in this type of absolutism, using Royce's own illustration of the absolute in the incapacity of human beings to undo any action. Thus is emphasized the relation of form to action and the possibility of the finite to participate in the Absolute. He cites Professor Boodin's doctrine of Cosmic Structure to elucidate still further the Roycean meaning. Religion becomes then a belief in and action upon the ideal perfection which is held to be Cosmic. The essay is critical rather than a defense but the points are clearly taken and the distinctions set forth on the issue between James and Royce.

Is the Church Decadent?

In an article in *Religion in Life*, Professor Carl S. Patton goes sharply after the prophets of gloom under the caption: "In a Time Like This." Not only does Dr. Patton disclaim the decadence of the church, but believing "the sum of human cussedness" to be more or less of a constant, he does not believe that these are the worst and wickedest times that ever were. He recognizes the newer set of problems that scientific research, depression, shifting sense of values, breakdown of old authorities, have cast upon the present for solution. This unrest is seen by him as the matrix from which a better civilization will emerge. His optimism is in strict accord with that of the great Teacher who comforted his Disciples who faced a world of peril and change with the declaration: "When ye hear of wars and rumors of wars be not dismayed, for these are but the beginnings of the birth-pangs." Dr. Patton's attitude is essentially the Christian attitude which sees the confusion of a changing world as the prophecy of the birth of a better world and his standpoint is to be commended to all persons suffering from religious or intellectual jitters.

The New Scholasticism

Very marked is the new intellectual spirit which characterizes Roman Catholic scholars of the present day and which is indicated

by an increasing activity and the inauguration of many high grade journals and reviews. One of the most important of these, though not the latest, is the Quarterly which appears under the title of this article.

In the July number, Professor Edward A. Pace presents an enlightened discussion of "The Problem of Freedom." The article shows a broad acquaintance with the literature of the subject as well as a discriminating understanding of the weaknesses of deterministic mechanicism. He shows how both in philosophy and in science an unreasonable demand for unity has led to faulty generalization and the oversight of real differences.

The Philosophy of Science

In the April number of *The Philosophy of Science*, Professor Gaviola of Buenos Aires presents an article entitled, "The Impossibility of Interaction Between Mind and Matter." He emphasizes the necessity even in physics of the application of different concepts to different phases of the same event, as in the contrasting corpuscular and undulatory theories of light. He holds it improper to ask whether the corpuscular or the wave theory is *real*. "The only reality is the Cartesian primary fact: my existence as a consciousness that thinks. The immediate facts of my experience are constituted by the contents of my consciousness. . . . The purpose of science (including philosophy) is to order and classify the contents of my consciousness, with the ultimate aim of being able to predict future immediate facts of experience from past ones."

Light Out of Asia

Our readers will be interested in a monthly, comparatively new, now being published by Kelley and Walsh in Shanghai. It is a cultural magazine under an able board of Chinese editors that would do credit to any time or place. Especially in these days when so much of the future of civilization depends upon the Orient, and when the eyes of the world are fixed on China in particular, it is significant of the virile intellectual life of the Chinese that such a journal is possible. It is packed full of literary, philosophical, and historical interest from cover to cover.

No one who is really interested in China or who would become better acquainted with Chinese outlooks can well afford to leave this, the *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, off his magazine list. To us it is the most interesting and attractive magazine that comes to our table, is beautifully printed (and in good English). The able Editor-in-Chief is Dr. Wen Yuan-ning.

—R.T.F.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

Yesterday

Among the sweetest and yet most melancholy of employments is to let the mind wander over the events of yesterday. Each day presents us with new occasions, new sets of circumstance, so that the period of one revolution of the earth seems essentially different from another. The process is intensified with the happening of grave events like war, pestilence, or economic revolution. Anything which widely changes the condition of many people introduces an essentially new world.

To hosts of people the Great War was like a sword that cut their past off from the present. And time weaves the past always in fair colors so that the new world into which we have come seems a different world. The experience is as definite as the closing of a door after one has entered another room.

There is a certain large verity about such an experience, for the world in which we really live is one of passing associations, of fleeting impressions, of wide-spread social points of view. Life is made by our objectives and departs when these depart. The same mountains and hills may surround us, the same seas may beat their rhythmic melody at our feet, the same "fir-tree dark and high" may gather the winds of autumn, the same roof may shelter us now vocal with voices that have been swallowed up by the tides of life or the more silent tides of death. The external things swift as is their change do not bear the swiftness of these inner changes which make for us new worlds.

One looks into the face of an old companion to recall the world of yesterday when we wandered through virgin forests, following the little trodden trail, building our campfires far from the haunts of men by lonely lakes whose only alarm was the laughter of the great loon, or casting the fly where unsophisticated trout lay in readiness to attack every lure with savage eagerness. That day of leisurely detachment is gone and the new age when the roaring automobile approaches the most remote mountain fastness has arrived. The present seems to leave neither time nor place for detachment or solitude. Yet the difference is less external than internal. Life moves to a new tempo. It is pitched to a different key but it is left to us to make what world we shall live in. The only requirement that we cannot make is that it shall be the world of yesterday. From that we are severed by impassable barriers. Against its gates stands the angel with the flaming sword. But once gone it gathers all the illusions of a lost paradise. Such was yesterday. R. T. F.

Professor Morris' Reply

Professor Morris' reply to Professor Schiller which appeared in the Summer issue did not give the author's name. We apologize both to Professor Morris and to Professor Schiller for the oversight.

Diabolical Activity in a Print Shop

In the last issue, Professor Gomperz was given credit for the startling discovery of a new philosopher, "the great Leibnsky of Greitswold," which was of course meant by him as a reference to Leibniz of Greifswald. We know who was to blame but we mercifully refrain.

Perry to Schiller

Professor Schiller's review of my *Thought and Character of William James*, published in the Spring number of *The Personalist*, contains three misstatements which I should like to correct:

1. The reviewer states that I "plainly" do "not approve of James's style with its unprofessorial unconventionality." I do not know where the reviewer discovered this disapproval. I certainly do not feel it.

2. The reviewer refers to my "condemnation" of James's disregard of the line between psychology and philosophy. I have never felt any such condemnation nor, so far as I know, expressed any. I have myself stressed the obliteration of this line as "one of James's chief aims."

3. The evidence for James's "pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought" is not to be found (except perhaps indirectly) in James's "contempt for the futilities of formal logic, etc.," but in his repeated insistence on his own incapacity. I have taken pains to point out that, although he professed this incapacity, he nevertheless engaged in a very considerable amount of exact thinking.

Since these three points are matters of fact which can be verified by reference to the text I should like to have them brought to the attention of the readers of Professor Schiller's review.

RALPH BARTON PERRY.

Schiller's Reply to Perry

Professor Perry's letter shows how unsafe it is to judge by general impressions. I certainly got an impression that Professor

Perry disapproved of James's style, perhaps only because he did not praise it nor express the delight of the many who blessed James for his courage in breaking through the tradition of a dull pedantic technicality as the only permissible form of philosophic self-expression. But the fact that I did not refer to any specific passage in Professor Perry's book shows that my feeling was only an impression, and I am only too glad to learn that I was mistaken.

My other two "misstatements" differ from the above in that I *did* give references to Professor Perry's book, and that I still think they justify my remarks. If Professor Perry's epigram about James's "metaphysical infidelities" does not imply that James *did* make an (unsuccessful) attempt to draw a line between psychology and philosophy, it rather loses its point. I still think also that it is harsh, and probably mistaken, to interpret James's expressions of contempt for formal logic as proof of any "pathological repugnance to the processes of exact thought." I used to beseech James not to seem to concede "logic" to the enemy, for the reason that intellectualist logic was a thoroughly rotten affair; but James was always willing to concede to his opponents any verbal advantage (in this case, a monopoly of "logic") they might claim, and then to declare the concession worthless. James would at no time have accepted boasts about "the processes of exact thought" at their face value; nor would he have been flattered to be told that he had occasionally achieved "exact thought" himself.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Along the Bookshelf

Logic Has Its Day

THE THEORY OF LOGIC. An introductory Text. By *A. P. Ushenko*. Harper Brothers, New York and London. Pp. xii, 197. \$1.50.

This is an ambitious book. In it Professor Ushenko of the University of Michigan sets himself the aims, not only of writing an introduction to Whitehead and Russell's symbolic logic, of confuting the old Aristotelian Formal Logic and discrediting 'inductive' logic, but also of indicating the position of 'logical positivism,' and of expounding certain original corrections of his own. All this within the compass of 200 small pages! One cannot but feel sorry for the beginner who is expected to master all this in a "one-semester course," even with the omissions Professor Ushenko advises (p. xii). Personally I have not been convinced that, in the present condition of logical discussion, elementary logic is either capable of being taught or worth teaching. The old Aristotelian logic, if its fundamental assumptions and fictions are honestly displayed, can be taught—as a word-game. The methodology of science can be taught—as pragmatic logic. Some day, perhaps, the manipulations of language and the use of mathematics will be sufficiently understood to base so-called 'logics' on consistent verbalism and complete symbolism. But that time is not yet. At present 'Logic' is a confused aggregate of incompatible and heterogeneous traditions, which as a whole are meaningless, and the

more skill is devoted to its exposition the more plainly is it revealed as unbelievable nonsense.

This comes out clearly even from Professor Ushenko's concise account. He starts (p. 1) with saying that "Logic has been traditionally understood to give the principles of correct thought and therefore to be the instrument for criticism of the outcome of thinking." The "*therefore*" seems to be as good an example of a *non sequitur* as could be desired, in the light of the ambiguity (admitted on p. 22) between "thought" (-thinking)" as the advance of ideas and thought as a crystallized outcome of such an advance" and the further admission (*ibid.*) of "the inapplicability of logic to the processes of thinking." Actually "thought," for Professor Ushenko, is usually a verbal formula (or 'proposition') which is supposed to have been got by thinking, and is thereby enabled to repudiate its ancestry. What "correct thought" means, remains an enigma: it is plainly inconsistent with p. 27, where the *correctness* of judgments is contrasted with the *truth* (-claim) of propositions. However Professor Ushenko's final definition (p. 24) is that "Logic is a science concerned with propositions from the point of view of their form," and he struggles manfully to elucidate the notion of "form."

The traditional "Laws of Thought" Professor Ushenko does not venture to discard. They are taken as normative precepts, but nevertheless formulated as

A is A, A is not non-A, and everything is either A or non-A. Nor does he attempt to meet the obvious objections to these formulations. In actual use the law of identity is taken as '*A is A*', i.e., anything called *A is A*, which is downright false. The law of contradiction seems a flat denial of the possibility of change. In its mutilated form, without the addition "or both or neither," the law of excluded Middle overlooks two possibilities, that of the ambiguous and that of the unmeaning. And taken *en bloc* these fantastic "laws" render any "logic" which adopts them totally incapable of formulating any thinking and any knowing. Professor Ushenko dimly realizes this. He admits that his logic has for its prerequisite "terms which have fixed meanings" (pp. 137, 140). But such fixity of meanings is a gross and blatant fiction: it is destructive of all significant assertion, and is confuted, not only by the progress of every science, but by every attempt to transmit information from one mind to another. For in actual thinking no judgment would be made, if it were not supposed to convey some novelty of thought, and so far altered the meaning of its terms.

Hence the only question that really arises about the abstractions on which Formal Logics erect their castles in the air is whether their result is better denominated a word-game or a tautology. On this point Professor Ushenko does not appear to have made up his mind (p. 131 f.); occasionally he even toys with the possibility of expanding his "truth-table" by adding "objective probability"

to the two truth-values, *true* and *false* (p. 133). But if he thereby means to surrender to the modern insight that scientific "truths" (and errors) are all more or less probable, absolute truth and falsity become merely ideal "limits," and in actual knowing we shall always be dealing with formulas more or less *adequate* for our purpose in a context. Needless to say this procedure renders all the pretenses of all the Formal Logics otiose.

LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC.
By *Alfred J. Ayer*, Lecturer in Philosophy at Christ Church, Oxford. Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. Pp. 254. 9/ net.

This is the second impression, published in April, of a book which first appeared in January. So it must approximate to that miracle of bookselling, a philosophic best-seller. Deservedly, for it is more brightly, clearly, and incisively written than anything that has emanated from the young men of Oxford for over a generation, say since the Christmas Number of *Mind*. It appears to owe its genesis largely to a change which has come over the habits of young English academics since the War, when they go abroad to learn German and to complete their education. Instead of going to Berlin and the other academic resorts of Hitlerized Germany, and there being befogged with 'German idealism' and stuffed with apothecoses of Prussian patriotism, they prefer to go to Vienna, where life is pleasanter, even if the German is not so good. There they enter into the sphere of the 'Vienna Circle,' which is rapidly expanding to international proportions, and pick up what

they had been brought up to regard as the most impious blasphemies against the most sacred mysteries of philosophy.

This appears to have been the fate of Mr. Ayer, whose book is the first effective statement of 'logical positivism' in English. One cannot perhaps say that he has bettered his instruction, but he certainly sets the traditional ninepins a-tumbling, and puts the case of the Vienna Circle ruthlessly. Metaphysics are, one and all, unnecessary nonsense, because their propositions are insusceptible of empirical verification. The *a priori* propositions of logic and pure mathematics are "necessary and certain only because they are analytic," i.e., tautologies revealing only the structure of language. "They do not make any assertion about the empirical world, but simply record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion. Propositions concerning empirical matters of fact, on the other hand, I hold to be hypotheses, which can be probable but never certain" (p. 11). The problem of truth is reduced to the question *How are propositions validated?* and this always involves an appeal to experience, though no empirical propositions are absolutely certain, and no verification yields indefeasible proof of a hypothesis (ch.V). The existence of God and the soul's immortality are metaphysical, and therefore meaningless, assertions (Ch.VI) : so is a substantive ego (Ch.VII). And so forth and so on. Philosophy has no future except to become the logic of science. (p. 248).

All this, though it sounds a little sophomoric, is very enter-

taining and refreshing after so much rumination on the stale, dead, and putrid issues of the Great Tradition. It is not however so completely radical as it seems. For a complete pragmatism goes a good deal beyond logical positivism, even though it drops most of Mr. Ayer's subversive paradoxes on the way. The truth is that logical positivism arose historically from a fusion of Mach's sensationalist positivism and the logistics of Wittgenstein (i.e., Russell). It adopted Peirce's account of meaning, Bridgeman's operational account of verification, and, sometimes, the 'Pickwickian' sense of *a priori* used by C. I. Lewis (to whom Mr. Ayer refers p. 148). But it has not so far, emancipated itself from logical Formalism, nor adopted the pragmatic theory of truth, nor fully grasped the logical import of language.

So it continues to regard 'logic' as a matter of 'propositions' without seeing that it thereby renders it as meaningless as 'metaphysics.' It has not yet seen that in actual use 'propositions' turn into judgments and are *always* 'synthetic.' That is, they would not be formed or used unless they were *thought* to convey a scientific novelty or a meaning new to those to whom they are addressed. Also, when they succeed in so doing, they always change and develop the verbal meaning of their terms. Hence it is an illusion to attribute any absolute fixity to language and finality to its 'analysis.' Scientific language must, and does, develop with scientific knowledge, and every word 'means' all that it has meant and may be made to mean here-

after. Hence, as a word, it is indefinitely *ambiguous*; it acquires definite meaning only in use, in a context, and for a purpose. A logic which overlooks or fails to penetrate to these essentials, remains an idle game with abstractions.

It should finally be pointed out that logical positivism has not yet completely assimilated the lesson of Hume's critique of causality. It still retains the notion of objective necessity in logic, while discarding it in metaphysics (e.g., p. 213). But if Hume proved anything it was that 'necessary connexions' were really subjective and psychological *everywhere*. Hence they must be eliminated from logic and replaced by the natural cohesion of purposive trains of thought. Thus the ground would be prepared for the recognition by logic and science of the voluntarism and personalism which have been so unwarrantably excluded by the Greek tradition in philosophy. F. C. S. S.

The Scientific Ladder

ALCHEMY, CHILD OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. By *Arthur John Hopkins*. Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. x, 262. \$3.50.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF SCIENCE. By *A. W. Haslett*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xi, 317. \$2.00.

In *Alchemy, Child of Greek Philosophy*, Arthur John Hopkins reminds us of the humble beginnings in alchemic speculation of modern science. This is a valuable service to perform for an upstart generation prone to forget the rungs of the ladder by which it has ascended. The term "alchemy" has a bad odor, dependent more or less upon the

derivation of the word from the Egyptian *chem* meaning "black" and being often referred to as the black art, that bugaboo of medieval ecclesiasticism secretly indulged by many ecclesiastics of the time. There is no small wonder that retaining a portion of the original term the bad reputation could be retrieved under the term chemistry.

However much we may be inclined to despise the days and works of alchemy however, we shall have to find therein not only the beginnings but likewise the inspiration of much of modern science. Very surprising is the long time that elapsed between the coming of alchemy to Europe through Moslem and Jewish scholars and the rise of what might truly be called chemistry, for Boyle, Lavoisier and our own Anglo-American Priestley were the first true chemists and they seem to us quite modern. More than half a millennium had to elapse before alchemy could grow into chemistry. Equally striking are the mighty strides of chemical knowledge made in the last century.

The long delay will by many be laid to the prevalence of philosophy over experience, but the delaying effect of hypothesis may even yet be more or less operative in chemical research so that it will not do to reproach too severely the ancients.

Their obsessing hypothesis was the belief in the ultimate identity of all substances and the attempt because of this to transmute baser metals into gold. The surviving echo of this in our time is the belief that gold is a quantitative rather than a qualitative fact which may be induced

in baser metals by electric charge. In a day when the possession of gold meant the way to power, it is not strange that transmutation was the chief aim of the alchemists. They had not learned that yellow was not the distinguishing feature of gold but presumed that what was yellow was gold and what could be yellowed was thereby made into gold. As Chesterton put it:

All is gold that glitters
For the glitter is the gold.

Under such a belief one's gold grew on his hands provided he had enough to tint to yellow any baser metal he had on hand.

The book offers a most understanding and interesting interpretation of the early steps of scientific achievement and should be the required introduction to chemical study.

If Hopkins can be said to view the state of science from the foot of the ladder, A. W. Haslett, Foundation Scholar of King's College, Cambridge, may be charged with taking a look from the top rung in his *Unsolved Problems of Science*. To those who have looked to science for the solution of all problems, physical, economic, political, spiritual, and moral, it will be something of a disappointment to learn how many questions remain unanswered. Indeed, with our best modern understanding and knowledge there are some like the action of light which seem to bear out contradictory hypotheses. The creation of the universe, the seemingly unique set of conditions which was brought into being with our earth, the origin of man, the question of other worlds, the

sources of change, of weather, the riddle of sex, these and many other gaps in knowledge we have commonly glossed over with the glib verbiage of hypotheses which we have strangely mistaken for facts of knowledge.

In the face of recent advances in scientific theory our author with a certain timidity tries to assure us that it is altogether wrong to speak of scientific revolution. If the change, however from the old scientific absolutes of a generation ago to the new doctrine of relativity, or the new concept of basic matter as energy rather than mass lumpishness, inertness and ponderability is not a revolution in theory, we do not know the meaning of the term. And this is not to mention the breakdown of the second "law" of thermo-dynamics, the ancient concept of gravitation or the conservation of energy. The arguments he uses against describing as revolution what has taken place would be equally cogent in proving that the change from Ptolemaic to Copernican astronomy was not a revolution.

However, to mention this weakness is too much perhaps to pick flaws in an otherwise delightful and informing book. It was a work quite worth doing and describes the future points of attack which must appear to a wide-awake and progressive science.

R. T. F.

THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY. By P. W. Bridgman, Professor of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy, Harvard University. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. Pp. vii, 138. \$2.00.

This book contains the substance of three Vanuxem Lec-

tures, delivered at Princeton in December, 1935. By his *Logic of Modern Physics* Professor Bridgman had put himself in the first rank of those who had expounded the pragmatic character of scientific procedure, and in these Lectures he further increases the gratitude of those who are desirous of knowing, from an authoritative source, what modern physicists are really doing. He deals, briefly but lucidly, with Operations, Thought and Language, Logic, Mathematics, Mathematics in Application, Relativity, Mathematical Models and Probability, and Wave Mechanics, and is particularly successful in bringing out the gaps in the ordinary popular accounts of the application of mathematics to reality. His account of these things could hardly be bettered, and he is particularly happy (and severe) in his comments on Jeans' rash assertion that God is a mathematician (p. 67).

Extremely valuable too, is Professor Bridgman's clear admissions that "strictly speaking, the connotation of the same words can never be twice the same, but connotation is continually being slightly altered as the living matrix in which it is embedded alters" (p. 24). This means that the postulation of *fixity* of meaning is strictly a *fiction*, and that it suffices if we can get *stability* enough (cp. p. 45). Professor Bridgman admits also (p. 42) that "because of the fundamental properties of activity itself, truth can have no such static, absolute meaning as we would like to give it," and that we "have no criterion by which one can tell in advance whether complete success is possible or not, so that . . . we must always be prepared for

partial failure." "Truths" therefore change as knowledge grows (p. 43) and "it is meaningless to talk about the thing in itself, for we always have the system operator and operand" (*ibid*). Thus "mathematics is ultimately an experimental science" (p. 52), and "there is no getting away from preferred operations and a unique standpoint in physics": . . . "it is *I* who have the experiences I am trying to co-ordinate and . . . *I* must be the ultimate center of any account which I can give" (p. 83). Finally (p. 121) one great advance of wave mechanics is that it recognizes that "the act of observation is an essential feature in any physical situation," and that "no act of observation can be performed without interfering with the system in a manner not capable of complete control." Professor Bridgman sees that the implications of all this are "philosophical": they point in fact to a personalistic physics as to a personalistic logic. A bitter pill indeed for the theories which thought that personality could be abstracted from and ignored, but perhaps meaning only that this abstraction had hitherto worked well enough for the rough purposes and cruder observations of incipient sciences!

This explanation is confirmed by the trouble about the "Law of Excluded Middle." The mathematicians when they borrowed from Logic the conception of the "truth-values," 'true' and 'false,' naively assumed that they were absolutely true and exclusive. But after all the old formal logicians had been cautious enough to set up the formula, *A is either B or not B, or both, or neither*, and had thereby left room for

the ambiguous and the meaningless, which modern symbolic logics are vainly trying to ignore.

F. C. S. S.

Culture, Ancient, Medieval, and Modern

A BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREEK PEOPLE. By *Cecil Fairfield Lavell*. Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston. Pp. xii. 297. \$3.00.

THE MIGRATION OF CULTURE. By *Rendel Harris*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Pp. 60. 5s. net.

THE HERITAGE OF THE CATHEDRAL. By *Sartell Prentice*. William Morrow and Company. Pp. xxi, 328. \$3.50.

THE FATE OF MAN IN THE MODERN WORLD. By *Nicholas Berdyaev*. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee. Pp. 120. \$1.25.

The relation of the Greeks to modern civilization and the greatness of their contribution to modern life is skillfully set forth by Professor Cecil Fairfield Lavell in his *A Biography of the Greek People*.

We have here a history with a difference for it is a consideration of the forces that make history. It is this very distinction which Croce has set forth in his work *On History* that separates between what is merely chronology and what is history.

In presenting the development of Greek thought as the background of history Professor Lavell shows a profound understanding. His method enables him to disclose the sources of history and therewith the Greek heritage of western culture.

Notwithstanding, the book is well and popularly written, is accurate in details, and will be eagerly read by the general public.

It is history written from a different angle in the truest historical method.

In a series of brief essays, *The Migration of Culture*, Dr. Rendel Harris attempts to establish the theory that Central and South America were colonized by the ancient Egyptians, by Egyptianized Celts, and by the Basques. He demonstrates his thesis by comparative language and the survival of place names in the Americas. He appears to make a strong case, as anyone may with a wide knowledge and much special pleading. One lays down the book, however, with a strong suspicion that the question of the origins of Aztec and Mayan civilization are far from determined. He has had a considerable number of forerunners in the field. Another Englishman, nearly a hundred years ago, Mr. E. Pockocke in another book, *India in Greece*, on the same principle of place names, and far more convincingly and exhaustively, made connection between Aztec and Indian culture.

Late researches by students of Sinology have led some of them to affirm a distinctly Pacific Basin culture for Asia, Polynesia and the Americas. In this case it is presumed that culture travelled east instead of west. Perhaps the study of American remains and the discovery of the lost Mayan and Aztec languages may some day settle the question of origins. But it cannot yet be assumed in spite of the pleasing presentation of Dr. Harris.

For all lovers of the Cathedrals and of the Middle Ages, Prentice's charming book will possess a most fascinating interest. One is instantly reminded of another

book in the same field, Henry Adams' *Mont Saint-Michel and Chartres*. But it is no repetition of that book for it would seem to have thoughtfully avoided the two great examples that form the basis of Adams' discussion. This book goes much farther afield and must be considered more cosmopolitan and it is attended by an astonishing erudition and knowledge of the by-paths of European history.

The literary style is engaging and the language so non-technical that the book will be of equal interest to the trained architect and to the wayfaring reader. Moreover, the spirit of the author which shines through the book is not only reverential and appreciative but intensely modern. This gives a double value to what he writes. From the vastness of the fields he treats in comparatively small compass it is easy to give credence to his introductory claims of wide travel and many years spent in preparation. It is an essentially interpretive book as it discusses the historic sources of matters common to our church life but mostly forgotten or unknown.

There is much to which scholars will take exception. Why can the author assume that the early existence of astronomical observatories in China implies an early knowledge by them of glass of unusual transparency or of telescopic lenses? A trip to the famous Planetarium of Peking discloses no telescopes. Such an assumption illustrates the freedom with which the author transmutes the suggestions of a fertile imagination into assumed historic fact.

He seems to us to be on even

less secure footing in the second and brief part of the book entitled "Archaeology." Here we have only far-fetched analogy and guess-work founded on the scientific superstitions of a somewhat discarded anthropology. In fact, it is the weakness of the book in general to assume that similarities imply historical and causal connection.

Such strictures as these, however, are small compared with the great value of the book and particularly with the author's clear insight into the factors which make human history.

Nicholas Berdyaev must be counted among the outstanding writers of the day. Whatever he writes is eagerly seized upon with the expectation of finding something original, something suggestive and searching. In his volume *The Fate of Man in the Modern World*, he deals with the War as a judgment on history, with the dehumanization of modern life, with the new forces in the world's life and finally with the relation of culture to Christianity. He intends the work as a sort of supplement to a previous volume, *The End of Our Time*.

He declares that the War educated a generation of believers in force and that not only is the socialization of society taking place in accordance with this principle but that it is being applied to the soul of man as well as to his physical welfare. In the meantime all the old religious sanctions for the powers which hold great masses in organic order have vanished.

The great danger lies in the disappearance of freedom which is essential to all creativeness.

Escape from dictatorship is possible only by moral rebirth and the application of creative spiritual forces (p. 59).

The process now at work in the world means not only the end of individualism, but also terrible danger to the eternal truth of personalism, which means a threat to the very existence of human personality (p. 65).

Especially interesting is the author's discrimination between individualism and personalism (p. 67):

Individualism is either a bourgeois attitude toward life, or the isolation of a few aesthetes. Personalism, on the other hand, is the realization in man of the image and likeness of God.

We feel that Berdyaev is extreme at times in his generalizations, as when he writes "there is no social demand for culture of a higher order, for spiritual culture, for real art or real philosophy." "There is no desire for the things of the spirit" (102).

He seems to belie his own thesis of the renovating power of the spiritual when he bewails the material pressure, loneliness and poverty cast by our civilization upon the world's creative minds. It is the task of the human spirit to rise to the greatest heights of achievement out of such surroundings and such is the tale of history. He seems to us, therefore, to be inconsistent, for his own program calls for a rebirth of society through suffering.

The book is strong in pointing out the formative forces of our modern society. R. T. F.

Biographies of Modest Men

ON WRITING THE BIOGRAPHY OF A MODEST MAN. By *Rollo Walter Brown*. An Intimate Glimpse of Dean LeBaron Russell Briggs. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. 49. \$1.00.

GEORGE HERBERT PALMER. 1842-1933. Memorial Addresses. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. 80. \$1.25.

Not only those for whom the names of Dean Briggs and Professor Palmer have become a tradition in American education, but lovers of biography as well, will find of interest two brief studies published recently by the Harvard University Press. *On Writing the Biography of a Modest Man*, by the biographer of LeBaron Russell Briggs, is a fascinating glimpse into the character of one whom as a life-long friend he is able to call "a kind of beloved phenomenon." No higher praise could be given than the writer's confession that "the closer I came to him, the more genuine I found him. The high level on which he lived was his natural level."

George Herbert Palmer comprises two memorial addresses and a faculty minute by members of the department of Philosophy in Harvard University, delivered in December 1933, at a meeting in honor of the man who, more than any other, was responsible for the development of the high philosophic tradition in that institution. Professor Charles M. Bakewell contributes "The Philosophy of George Herbert Palmer," and Professor William Hocking offers "Personal Traits of George Herbert Palmer."

Each of these little volumes, either of which can be read in a casual hour, exhibits equally the

truth of Mr. Brown's observation about his beloved friend, that he was his "surest proof that not all of life is futile."

W. H. L.

In the Field of Literature

THE ISSUE IN LITERARY CRITICISM. By *Myron F. Brightfield*. University of California Press, Berkeley, California. Pp. xii, 316. \$4.00.

DANTE VIVO. By *Giovanni Papini*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xii, 340. \$3.50.

ERASMUS: LECTURES AND WAYFARING SKETCHES. By *P. S. Allen*. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Pp. xii. \$5.00.

"This book aims to give organic and systematic expression to the working principles of literary criticism" (p. vii.), from the standpoint of "orthodox pragmatism," as taught by A. W. Moore, B. H. Bode, G. H. Mead, J. H. Tufts, and particularly Dewey (p. viii). Its black sheep are the idealists, whether 'easy' (like the romantics and impressionists) or 'difficult,' like the "neo-humanists" (Babbitt, Elmer More, and Norman Foerster, who ought to become empiricists. Now pragmatism "is the scientific philosophy" (p. 27), whereas idealism is always trying to find "a genuinely real which lies behind an apparent real" (p. 33). It is an "evasion to flee from the world to a dream . . . in a realm of absolute perfection" (p. 44), and has "no definite tests for truth and error" (p. 47). After thus rejecting idealism in philosophy, Professor Brightfield proceeds to discuss beauty relatively to human experience and to reject the antithesis between the beautiful and the useful (p. 72 f). He makes the beautiful a subdivision of the useful, and holds that "anything which is beautiful must also be useful" (p. 73). The

"beautiful contains a clear reference to the future": it stands for what a man could use if he possessed it, and its function is "to translate itself into the useful" (*ibid.*).

Now this is certainly striking and even startling doctrine, not only because aesthetic values have often been considered recalcitrant to utilitarian analysis, but also because it seems to defy such empirical facts as that the *same* object can be valued by one man as beautiful and by another as useful, that objects inimical to man, such as tigers, may be judged beautiful (cp. p. 75), and that the beautifying and adorning of tools and weapons seems usually to follow upon rather than to precede their utility and to be expressive of the affection which their usefulness has generated. Until it has met such difficulties I must hesitate to regard Professor Brightfield's book as wholly successful: it provides however stimulating reading.

F. C. S. S.

A new life of Dante by a man who must be accorded a high place among the literary geniuses of our time! And what a combination of lights he brings to the task! For Papini rather proudly boasts that none other could do it so well unless he too, like Papini were a Florentine, an artist, and a Catholic. Though one not of his own hot-tempered race would dare to seem so self-assured, so scornful of others who, through the centuries, have undertaken the task of Dantean biography, yet the author comes very close to making good his boast, since there is never a dull moment and the great Florentine is made to stand before us in all

the vividness of his human strengths and weaknesses.

In fact, the author is more or less moved by the modern philosophy of biography that deep enough probing will disclose scandal and even wickedness in in the general belief that practically all men are at some time roués and if it is not historically clear it must be assumed. This shows us the blind spot in our Papini, the futility of his boasting. Though he be a Florentine, an artist, and a Catholic, his powers of interpretation nevertheless suffer limitations. He cannot turn back the past, nor can he re-orient himself in the Florence of Dante's time. In spite of himself this is a modern life of Dante, written from the standpoint of reactions of the modern man.

If he but knew it, it is this modern feeling which is the basis of the author's dissatisfaction with other biographies. It is not necessarily because they are so poor but because they no longer meet the demands of the modern spirit. Nor is it to be accounted failure if Papini evaluates Dante from the modern standpoint, for Dante is one of those great figures of history calling for new appraisal in every age and offering each something of novelty and inspiration. That the author interprets Dante as he was, is not only not certain, but he almost certainly does not. That would be as impossible as it would for thirteenth century Dante, come to earth, to interpret the life of twentieth century Papini. The biography is no less valuable in that it has the modern touch. This modernity is of far greater significance than to attempt to stir meticulously the ashes of

dead history. But it cannot claim to be the final biography.

Here and there throughout the work one finds the polished arrows of the author's speech in words like these:

"An unbearable sense of mediocrity is the point of departure for attaining to greatness (34). The soul, brought low and hemmed in by circumstance, will rise, create for itself another environment, restore the equilibrium between fate and aspirations, reply with a victorious *yes to all noes* of life (35).

There is always danger that the great will become more completely buried by the dust of adulation than than by the dust of the ages. Hence any author who can give to such a character the modern touch, reveal the modern note, is doing a great service. This Papini has done for us superbly in spite of what must seem iconoclasm and a careless handling of old and dear ideas.

R. T. F.

Erasmus is one of those men who like Spinoza are remembered as much for what they were themselves as for what they thought and did. This the late P. S. Allen emphasizes in the opening chapter of his posthumously collected and published volume, *Erasmus, Lectures and Wayfaring Sketches*. These essays, covering a wide variety of topics, contain no particular additions to the author's lifetime contribution to Erasmus scholarship, but they form delightful informal reading, especially for those for whom Erasmus stands as the symbol of tolerance and urbanity in an age fraught with dogmatism and strife.

Perhaps the most important chapter is that concerning "Erasmus on Church Unity," which contains a translation of a composition of Erasmus' later life entitled *De sarcienda Ecclesiae concordia*. In this chapter the author gives a sympathetic account of Erasmus advocacy of a liberal attitude in the religious controversy of the time. Naturally his attempt at reconciliation was historically futile, not merely because of the intolerance of the contending parties but also because for Erasmus himself the controversy had no meaning. Certainly he was quite unaware of the historical significance and reality of the controversy taking place. To him it was merely an unnecessary disturbance of his academic and gentlemanly realm. Liberalism to be a real force determining human affairs must perhaps arise within controversy and not external to it; it must be the outgrowth of concern, not of indifference. As for Erasmus, though he preached liberalism with regard to church unity, he was in effect conservative. In this connection the following quotation from the work of Erasmus mentioned above may be of interest:

Look at these unhappy Anabaptists. . . . Their refusal to obey princes is quite at variance with Christ's command to render unto Caesar the things of Caesar; and the Communism they attempt was only possible when the church was small, and then not among all Christians: as soon as the Gospel spread widely, it became quite impossible. The best way towards agreement is that property should be in the hands of lawful owners, but

that out of charity we should share with one another (P. 95).
H. J. S.

Poetic Flowers and Weeds

BROWN LEAVES AND PETALS. By *Gertie Stewart Phillips*. The Kaleidograph Press, Dallas. 1934. Pp. 87. \$1.50.

FOOL'S GOLD. By *Clyde Robertson*. Illustrated by Sheila Burlingame. Banner Press, Atlanta. 1934. Pp. 95. \$2.00.

PRELUDE TO WINTER. By *Helen Frith Stickney*. Banner Press, Atlanta. 1934. Pp. 71. \$1.50.

ENCHANTED WINDOW. By *Virginia Spates*. The Kaleidograph Press, Dallas. 1934. Pp. 112. \$1.50.

The search for true poetry in the little volumes of verse that come from our presses is always accompanied by the hope that there may not be too many weeds among the flowers. Unfortunately, there are a good many weeds in the volumes here under review.

Brown Leaves and Petals by Gertie Stewart Phillips reveals its author as possessing the truest touch and the most consistently sustained gift of lyricism. There is hardly a poem that does not make its appeal, through well-chosen imagery, to our sense of wistful regret for the passing of beautiful things or the somewhat saddened enjoyment of beauty that we know to be transitory. The writer's perception of the varied beauty of the seasons is delicate and true, as in "Seeing Summer Go," "Wearying for Roses," "Defiance to Frost," "Rainy Night," and "Drouth." Some of the imagery, the unusual economy in the use of words, and the catch in the breath are reminiscent of Emily Dickinson, particularly in poems like "Silver Wonder" and "Contrast." Surely

no one who knows Emily Dickinson's "The Bustle in a House" will fail to catch the echo in "Dust of Dreams":

Who swept a heart and closed its door
Because love went away.
And would not need it any more
Today or any day, —

Forgot to draw the casement blind.
O little seeking beams
Of sun did you expect to find
This dust of shattered dreams?

Fool's Gold by Clyde Robertson is a very different type of verse. The poems grouped under the book-title are chiefly narrative poems portraying, in a naturalistic style, typical characters and episodes of a Colorado mining community, where stark drama seems the rule. Here are

Young Poney Nelson
The talk o' the town,
Gadding the streets
In a scarlet gown.

and

*** a weather-beaten woman known
There 'bouts as "Shootin' Sue";
Who patrolled her yellow diggin's
there
Alongside o' The Blue.

Like the illustrations in the book, these poems have a certain crude force, but one wonders how they could have won a prize in the Verse Craft National Contest for 1933. The second, and smaller, group of poems under the title "Pale Lady and Other Poems" are chiefly descriptive verses on commonplace themes.

Prelude to Winter by Helen Frith Stickney contains seven groups of poems, chiefly descriptive in character and handling for the most part various aspects of external nature. They are, however, without distinction except for the group of four poems labeled "New England Portraits." There are truth and real feeling in "Vermont" and "Here

Was Silence Once," and human understanding characterizes "New England Pattern" and "Letitia, Spinster."

Enchanted Window by Virginia Spates presents a drab format that matches the drabness of its contents. Though containing several poems reprinted from the author's previously published *Wings Against the Wind*, the volume stands unembellished with a single poem to lift one above the commonplace or the merely pious. Nature, moral problems, and religious sentiments predominate among the subjects. Characteristic of the tone and quality of these verses is the last stanza of "Home":

Though earth be filled with beauty,
And hearts delight to roam,
When one has loved the green hills,
No other place is home.

One does not require the "touchstones" of Matthew Arnold to discover that this is not poetry.

Louis Wann.

AMADO NERVO: MEXICO'S RELIGIOUS POET. By *Esther Turner Wellman*. Instituto de las Espanas, Columbia University, New York. Pp. 292.

A discussion of the extensive and varied literary expressions of the Mexican, Amado Nervo, must take account of his many-sided intellectual life. The author of this volume has wisely limited her treatment to three aspects of his work which especially show his religious thought: "His Skepticism, his Mysticism, and his final philosophy of Universal Love."

Many contributing influences are identified as affecting his development; yet these do not take from him an element of original-

ity in which lies his greatest charm.

Early training for the priesthood, abandoned after taking first orders, explains his acquaintance with scholasticism and the mystics of the church.

Born into the seething maelstrom of evolutionary and critical revolution his alert mind reacted immediately to French scepticism as seen in Renan and Taine, and later to Bergson and Maeterlinck. But he was also intimately associated with the Spanish intellectuals of the generation of 1898, particularly with the exceedingly stimulating personality of Unamuno.

Recognizing that Nervo is at all times a poet, Mrs. Wellman seeks to determine whether his religious history followed the lines of intellectual and experimental research, or was the result of emotional and esoteric interest.

The course of his growth is first traced in the literary field, where he passed successively from early Realism and Naturalism through Symbolism and Parnassianism, where French innovations strongly affected him, to his mature and distinctly individual contributions to literary Modernism, in which his extreme simplicity and elevated moral tone sharply contrast with most of the Modernist school of literature.

Mrs. Wellman is most interested in Nervo's religious thought which she describes as his "Quixotic Adventures through Philosophy." Attributing his earlier revolutionary tendencies to his association with the Mexican "*Científicos*" who were followers of Rousseau and Comte, although

he could not go whole-heartedly with them because he could not let go entirely of his early and probably innate mysticism; he is shown coming under the very definitely monistic philosophy of Renan and Taine, with no small regard for Darwin and Spencer.

Temperamentally more like Renan, Nervo retains many of the characteristics of that genial French thinker. But he goes even farther. Laughing with Renan at the absurd idea of a "Police God" he describes himself as a veritable "Don Juan of souls"—a "curious combination of two characters in Spanish literature—of Don Juan and the mystic."

It would be impossible briefly to tell the story of Nervo's intellectual, religious and emotional peregrinations; but we shall miss the central figure in his picture of life if we fail to see the hooded mysterious personage who is the mingling of Saint Francis of Assisi and Jesus of Nazareth.

The pantheism of the one and the gentle love and wisdom of the other come at last to be the lofty ideal and the very life of Amado Nervo. Mrs. Wellman closes her stimulating and virile study of Nervo's religious development with his own appropriate words: "When I die let those who read say: that man had nothing more than faith, and he gave it to us—he gave it all to us."

William F. Rice

HOSPITALITY

By AMADO NERVO

O Christ, our science modernized
Has pitilessly cast Thee out
From all our life; Thou hast not now
A place in which to dwell, O Lord!

Postivistic theories;
Material experiments;
Leave now in all the universe
No longer standing-room for God.

As for the soul of what is man,
In house of stone it has been closed,
Long since deprived of all its dreams,

Upon the threshold Vision now
Of anguish dead, of bitter cold.
At last in solitude remains.

In human dwelling-place today
There but remains a place for these:
Gross and voluptuous desire;
Ambition, and sheer vanity.

Thou hast no more a home, O Christ!
And how canst Thou go on along
Those roads where, scarcely hast Thou
touched
The echoing knocker at a door —
With clanging sound and raucous voice
They close it to Thee heartlessly!

The winged bird still has its nest;
The fox yet finds a haunt secure;
But Thou alone must go, exposed
To howling tempests, to the dread
Of the relentless night, and cold;
To such and so great loneliness . . .

I, Christ, am not two farthings worth.
My little heart (Thou knowest well
As no one else could know) has but
A tiny space, and little sun;
But what is there to do if now,
In all this region round about
There is none else. . . . Come Thou and
let

Me, thus confused and trembling so
With shame, give hospitality
To Thee in my own humble heart!

Translated by William F. Rice.

[The Editor here calls attention to the charming translation by Dr. Rice of Nervo's book of essays entitled *Plenitude*.]

A PHYSICIAN-POET OF THE RENAISSANCE

THE SINISTER SHEPHERD: A Translation of Girolamo Fracastoro's *Syphilidis sive de morbo gallico libri tres*. By William van Wyck. The Primavera Press, Los Angeles. 1934. Pp. xxiv, 87. \$4.50.

The Sinister Shepherd by William van Wyck is a most unusual and question-raising book. Why should a twentieth-century poet and translator, well-known for several fine volumes of creative poetry and for his translations of three great classics, choose to

render into English a poem in Latin hexameters by a sixteenth century Italian physician on what has been known to English readers as "the French disease?" This question may be followed by another: Why should anyone choose to write such a poem in the first place? The translator has answered both questions to our satisfaction, not merely in his Introduction, but in his skillful rendering of this most interesting literary document.

Girolamo Fracastoro, who was born at Verona in 1483, studied at Padua, where he assumed the chair of philosophy in 1502, practiced medicine for half a century with great distinction, and died near Verona in 1553. His success as a physician was even less than his renown as a poet, and the *Syphilidis*, to which we owe the now commonly accepted term for the dread scourge of which he writes, was only one of his various literary achievements. With the objectiveness characteristic of the age and with his own cultured and scientific approach to a phenomenon about which so little was then known, Fracastoro proceeded to tell, in polished hexameters, all that was known of the extent, symptoms, possible origins, and multifarious treatments of the disease. He shared the general tendency of the time to ascribe the origins to a conjunction of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, though he came close to Pasteur's bacterial theory in his belief that human maladies were caused by invisible particles. The most interesting portion of this document, however, is devoted to the mythological interpretation of the origins of the newly experienced scourge. According to the story, it was a shepherd boy,

named Syphilis, who refused to offer sacrifice to the Sun because drought had dried up the pastures. In punishment for this sacrilege he was visited with the disease which bears his name. Of especial interest to the physician is the detailed enumeration of the many and varied attempts to cure the malady, including the mercurial and sacred wood treatments and extensive suggestions regarding diet and exercise.

In rendering this work into English the translator disavows any intention of making a literal translation, and this is what one would expect of a translator who gave to Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales* the free and modern rendering of a few years ago. He has used the standard English pentameter line, with an artful variation of couplets and quatrains that produces an effect of unusual fluency and freedom from monotony. He has supplied many pertinent notes of explanation, and in addition to his own Introduction has prefixed an appreciation of Fracastoro from the pen of Albert Garrigues. An appendix contains another account of the malady from the pen of one of Fracastoro's contemporaries, Uldrich von Hutten. The book itself, which is one of the beautiful specimens from the press of Ward Ritchie, is embellished with ten most interesting reproductions of contemporary woodcuts and engravings, including one by Albrecht Dürer. This most unusual work should be of prime interest, not only to scientists and physicians, but also to the sociologist and the literary student.

Louis Wann

Miscellaneous

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY: The Story of the Teachers of the East. By *Frances Grant*. The Dial Press, New York. Pp. xi, 103. \$2.75.

This story of the teachers of India, China, Japan, Iran and Islam is straightforward, sustained in interest and easy and pleasant to read. It begins with an account of the Vedas, setting forth the Divine Wisdom revealed to the ancient seers of India, revelations recorded in hymns to the Pantheon of Gods. From the Vedas it passes to the Upanishads, which represent the essence of Hindu religious teaching. Then follows an account of the "Great Heresies," Jainism and Buddhism. From Buddhism we are led to an exposition of popular Hinduism as expressed in the worship of Vishnu and Siva, and the Avatars, Krishna and Rama, around whom the Ramayana and the Mahabharata are composed.

The chapter on Chinese philosophy is well handled. It sets forth Confucius' vision of a kingdom in which man shall live the good life in the perfect synthesis of equity and justice, counting it his responsibility to bring about "a just relationship of human beings to each other, and crystallizing his entire teaching into one word: 'Is there, Master,' asked his disciple, 'one word on which the whole of life may be based?' 'Yes—reciprocity. Do not do unto others that which you yourself do not desire.'" Confucius was not the first nor the last to set forth this Golden Rule, and we find its restatement by many of the great teachers of the world. Mencius, who followed Confucius laid particular stress on man's ethical nature. "Everything," he said,

"is within man—he has but to seek within himself and he will find all." Contemporary with Confucius, though fifty years his senior, is Lao-Tze with his doctrine of renunciation of action as opposed to the more positive aim of Confucius. To know thyself and be free is the key-note of Lao-Tze's teaching. "To know and yet think that we do not know is the highest attainment; not to know and yet think that we know is a disease."

The chapter on Japan is illuminating in its treatment of the religious beliefs which have become a part of Japanese history. To understand Japan is to sense, on the one hand, the spirit which pervades her life and her art, and, on the other, her stoical impassivity. For this we must go to the Shinto religion, to the belief in the Emperor, the divinely ordained ruler, descended from Amatersu, the Goddess of the Sun, and to the unique destiny of Japan which gave rise to the Samurai and the Code of Bushido—the Samurai vigorously trained in self-control, in the arts and the technique and practice of war.

The last chapter deals with Zoroaster and Manichaeism, and with Mohammedanism in Islam. The history of the Iranian people is allied to the Aryan progenitors of India, but in some early wave of unrest this branch split from the main stem and turned towards Media and Persia. The Gospel of Zoroaster came to this people just emerging from a nomad state, settling in an arid land, and bent on cultivating the soil. In making waste places flourish and bear corn and fruit man performed a duty to the Lord on High, Ahura Mazda. "He who sows corn sows holiness." Relig-

ion became a crusade against hostile forces. Light hurtled against darkness, the good conflicting with evil. For the Zoroastrians the vital active forces, Sun and Fire, became the symbols of the One Supreme Force, Ahura Mazda. Then Zoroastrianism came up against a rival religion, Manichaeism, with its gospel, an interweaving of the teachings of Zoroaster and Christ, and its dualistic universe of the separate and creative entities of Light and Darkness. In 625 A.D. Persia fell to Islam, but though conquered she herself became conqueror in the end, carrying her sense of exquisite beauty into the austere Moslem faith and producing Sufism. The sufis were mystics basing their religious experience on a selfless love, God's presence pulsing through the universe. With the Sufis music and song were the direct paths to divinity. Out of this arose a poetry that remains unequalled. Rabia, Sadi, Jami, Hafiz, Omar Khayyam and Jellad-ed-Din, mystic poets who found God's beauty pouring as sunlight through all things. In this connection it is of special interest to the Westerner brought up to an epicurean interpretation of Fitzgerald's Omar Khayyam, to learn the author's view of him as a scientist-mystic, God being for him as for his fellows both the wine of life and the wine-bearer. It is also interesting to note that the greatest of Persian mystics, Jellal-ed-Din, born in 1207, was a contemporary of St. Francis, and that both these great mystics share the same compassion for God's humblest creatures, the one preaching to the frogs and fishes and the other to the birds of the air.

For thirteen hundred years

millions of men throughout the world have turned in the direction of Mecca and have pronounced their prayer to Allah. It was Mohammed, the prophet of Islam, who united the factious elements of Arabia into one common faith, exterminating the tribal Gods in favor of the One Being, Allah. Belief in a common cause raised the Arab in one century from the wanderer in the desert to a force potent from Delhi to Granada. With the romance of Islam the story of the teachers of the East ends, "Each in turn kindling a light by which men may read the pages of an eternal book."

Geraldine Carr.

AESTHETIC ANALYSIS. By D. W. Prall. Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. Pp. 211. \$2.00

Dr. Prall limiting his subject to Aesthetic Analysis takes as his field "the surface of our experienced world," the knowledge of qualities in their immediacy as directly apprehended in sensuous structure. Every other aspect is irrelevant, for what penetrates and goes beyond the surface is non-aesthetical. So that all but the serial order that can be distinguished within the sensory content is negated. Those who divide art from philosophy and morality will doubtless follow Dr. Prall through his abstracting processes, taking the medium of art, sensation, to be the meaning. But in narrowing down the subject of art to Aesthetic Analysis have we not squeezed the very life out of it? Art that has meaning is human expression adopting a highly sensuous language, but it is at the same time a search of the whole mind or spirit into the depth of nature. That art is such spiritual experience is evident to

all who recognize great works of art, for art is both medium and meaning. The medium is sensuous, for art is obviously sensuous and therefore qualitative, but we look for meaning within presented content as an aspect of it, and meaning is spiritual and therefore quantitative. Art is formal matter that refers to space, time, measure, order, rhythm, etc., and these quantitative factors are of equal or of more importance than the sensuous, for as Bacon said long ago, "the Soul is form and doth the body make." Dr. Prall's initial distinction is confusing in that he identifies the qualitative with the sensuous, and presumably and somewhat ambiguously with the quantitative forms of perception, that is with space and time within the qualitative. Perception is after all quantitative in the matter of discreteness, and art must be both concrete and discrete, qualitative and quantitative. Aesthetic experience is not merely limited to the surface of our experienced world, but it is a bridge or symbol uniting the surface experience with the inner and hidden nature of the world. It is intuition apprehending reality. The chapter on *Relevance through Expression* seems to recognize this, for it deals with what guides artistic composition, what makes art characteristically individual, the artist's intention to express what he desires to express and the sensuous presentations of art become the expressed embodiment of feeling, in a word we are not left with "qualities in their immediacy" as the subject matter of aesthetic analysis, but the subject has widened to include meaning as well as medium.

Geraldine Carr.

DIE KRISE DES IDEALISMUS. By *Arthur Liebert*. Rascher Verlag, Zürich and Leipzig. Pp. 238.

The author of this volume is a political exile from Germany, and dates his preface from Belgrade. He is an enthusiast for 'idealism' who is confident that it will surmount all its 'crises,' and writes about it somewhat in the style of Eucken. But it is by no means easy to make out what he means by 'idealism' (or by 'realism' for that matter), beyond that it supports ideals, and extends from Plato to Hegel. He never defines it precisely, and one cannot but suspect that he is practising on his readers one of the old tricks of German philosophizing, viz. exploiting the ambiguity of the German article's collective use when '*der Idealismus*' is referred to, as guaranteeing the unity of whatever doctrines may be called 'idealism.' There is practically no reference to any non-German philosophy, but the book is dedicated to Professor E. S. Brightman of Boston University. F.C.S.S.

FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN NATURE. The Study of the Person. By *John Morris Dorsey*. Longmans, Green and Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 487. \$2.80.

It is certainly one of the curiosities of science that the ordinary individual man should not be deemed worthy of notice and study until he has become crazy. This is why the psychologist is eloquent about a great variety of 'laws' and 'principles,' but mum about the prediction and control of personal behavior. The psychiatrist alone displays any interest in the latter, and is willing to write books about it, which show, of course, his professional

bias. This is what has happened in the case of this book. Dr. Dorsey is an Associate Professor of Psychiatry in the University of Michigan Medical School, and he has produced a competent textbook on personality, with special reference to its diseases, which will no doubt be found serviceable by psychiatrists. With the philosophic problems of personality he does not concern himself, and he considers scientific knowledge that of greatest worth (p. 457). To judge by the number of his quotations, Dr. Dorsey's favorite authors (in their order of frequency) are Oscar Wilde, Pope, Elbert Hubbard, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Bertrand Russell and John Cowper Powys; but his method of relegating all his references to the end of his book, just in front of his subject-matter Index, is extremely inconvenient. F.C.S.S.

A PARSON IN REVOLT. By *Joseph McCulloch*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. xix, 174. \$1.50.

Rector McCulloch's *A Parson in Revolt* is a stinging attack on an ecclesiastical institutionalism which is crowding out of Christian institutions the very meaning and potency of Christianity itself. But it is not destructive alone. It is likewise a challenge and a call to such an emphasis on realities as shall reinstate the church in a position of moral and spiritual leadership. The author believes the church has lost its grip on society because it has emphasized the wrong things and has forgotten its essentially spiritual message. He likewise makes some suggestions for betterment. All churchmen, both lay and clergy, should read the book, which is really a stirring appeal

for better things from one who sincerely loves the church.

R.T.F.

WHY WARS MUST CEASE. By Ten Writers; edited by *Rose Young*. The Macmillan Company, New York. National Committee on the Cause and Cure of War.

It would be difficult to find a more imposing array of arguments against war than is presented in this Symposium, *Why Wars Must Cease*, written by ten prominent women among whom are Carrie Chapman Catt, Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt, Judge Florence E. Allen, Jane Addams and others.

It is argued that in the future no country can hope to secure benefits from war commensurate with the price paid in economic and human values. In the past wars may have achieved their objectives, but the last great war did not and it is becoming evident that the war idea is obsolete. The loss of human life cannot be estimated in statistics covering direct losses, since there are many by-products of war the results of which are never known for many years after. Economically the last great war was disastrous due to the burden of debt and the depreciation of currencies which directly resulted in the worldwide depression. The effectiveness of propaganda comes in for analysis. It is shown that whatever the cause of war, it is always made to appear a war of defense. The demoralizing influences upon civilian populations is revealed in the increase of crime. An unjust peace, or the will of the victor imposed upon the vanquished, lays the groundwork for future wars.

In a concluding chapter Dorothy Canfield Fisher finds in cer-

tain psychological factors an explanation of the continuance of war. She enumerates among other causes, human stupidity, war profits, the appeal of the army to large numbers of men who periodically must have change and excitement, and because many who have failed in the economic struggle are able to find a measure of security in army life.

The book is written in the white heat of conviction and enthusiasm and cannot fail to impress with its array of facts and sound argument. Several of the chapters are well documented with helpful bibliographies.

H.L.S.

The Return to Philosophy

RETURN TO PHILOSOPHY. By *C. E. M. Joad*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. 279. \$2.50.

A STUDY IN KANT'S AESTHETICS. By *Barrows Dunham*. Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Pp. xiii, 142.

OBITER SCRIPTA. Lectures, Essays, Reviews. By *George Santayana*. Edited by Justus Buchler and Benjamin Schwartz. Charles Scribners and Sons, New York. Pp. xiv, 319. \$2.50.

Return to Philosophy, by C. E. M. Joad, is, in the words of its sub-title, "a defense of reason, an affirmation of values and a plea for philosophy." Popularly written for the thinking laity, it makes a spirited attack in the name of intellectual integrity and a classical philosophy of life upon the obscurantism of Christian Science, the effusive nihilism of Aldous Huxley, the "belly-worship" of the redoubtable D. H. Lawrence, and the butter-and-egg "lowbrowism" common to both Main Street and campus row. The latter part of the volume provides a brief and simple restatement of his own meta-

physics which, as is well known, combines a Platonist theory of values and a realist theory of reality. On the whole this is a lusty and convincing criticism of modernism by one who finds in philosophy "a window—less clear than religion, but a window nevertheless — through which the consciousness of man attains a vision of the world of being."

W.H.L.

In spite of an undeniable richness and fertility in Kant's aesthetic writings, few have been convinced by his theory of beauty. This is due, in part, to the ambiguities and obscurities that invariably make thorny the path to a grasping of his critical philosophy. More particularly, however, it is due to the failure of Kant's theory to square with the facts, and to certain inconsistencies which, in this case, embellish rather than mar, the exposition. Our attention is called to these facts in a succinct and closely argued monograph, *A Study in Kant's Aesthetics*, by Dr. Barrows Dunham. This study, which is at once historical, analytical, critical and constructive, contends that while "Kant alone has grappled closely with the fundamental question," he has done little more than lay out the general path which an adequate aesthetics must follow. Kant's doctrine, it is held, is subjectivistic and fails to escape from the realm of psychological fact into that of ideal norm. In limiting beauty to a contemplative reaction to the form of objects, Kant proposed an aesthetic principle so narrow in scope that he himself was unable to keep within it. The Kantian doctrine, while sound as a starting point, it is argued, must be liberalized

to include both sensuous values and concepts, and, in fine are, the meanings of the artist.

The writer finds in Kant's obscure and incidental theory of play a profound reconciliation of the formal critical aesthetics and that of the critics of this view. "The theory of play," he writes, "holds one of the key-positions in Kant's aesthetics. It prevents the act of aesthetic enjoyment from sinking into that of cognition; explains the conceptlessness of the aesthetic judgment far better than Kant explains it, when he is trying to exclude teleology and morals; and it shows that in the world of sense experience there is a genuine freedom from scientific law, which serves better than anything else as a link with moral freedom. Above all, however, it is Kant's account of the difference between science and art."

As a constructive contribution Dr. Dunham insists that "the aesthetic experience consists precisely in the manner and the extent in which the whole self participates," and proposes as his own principle of taste the following: "An object is beautiful to the extent and the degree in which, by its form and sensuous qualities, it excites all the activities of the human self to the most refined and harmonious inter-play of which they are capable." This dissertation is admirable in its thoroughness, clarity and simplicity.

W.H.L.

Obiter Scripta contains a useful bibliography of Santayana's writings, and reprints also, in chronological order, a number of his papers, ranging from 1902 to 1932. The most important of these are on *Literal and Symbolic*

Knowledge, the Oxford Spencer Lecture on *The Unknowable*, and the review of Dewey's *Experience and Nature*, and they display Santayana as being as charming a stylist and as elusive a teacher as ever. By this I mean that those who have failed to understand what Santayana meant by his pivotal conceptions of "essence" and "substance," will not find their perplexities removed by anything he says in this volume, though he has a good deal to say about them (p. 128 f., p. 191 f.). Being myself in this unfortunate predicament, I was forcibly reminded of an occasion when I listened to an exquisite paper on Essences which Santayana read to the Oxford Philosophical Society and which was followed by a two-hour discussion. In this, all the Oxford philosophers, one after the other, tried to elicit from him what he meant by "essence." He answered every question courteously and apparently fully; yet at the end he left us all as wise, and as puzzled, as at the outset. I myself came away with the conviction that, though both Plato's sense of "essence,"

and also Aristotle's, lurked somewhere in the pedigree of Santayana's, yet the latter was a distinct species, generated perhaps by a desire to evade the problem of error; but I could never find that he had given any reason for ascribing "eternity" to essences or infallibility to their "intuition." He reiterates these claims in the present volume, but without strengthening his case. For in actual scientific use, all our conceptions, whether of not they have had any "objective validity" foisted on them by philosophers, are equally capable of growth and liable to correction; also their meaning depends on their context, and both their meaning and their value ("truth") on the purpose with which they are used. All these facts about them Santayana simply ignores, perhaps in virtue of the profound principle he enunciates on p. 239, that "reason is free to change its logic, as language to change its grammar." But, if so, should he not at least divulge to his readers what sort of "logic" is demanded by *his* "reason"?

F.C.S.S.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- AMADO NERVO: MEXICO'S RELIGIOUS POET. By *Esther Turner Wellman*. Instituto de los Espanas en Los Estados Unidos, Columbia University, New York. Pp. xii, 292. Paper cover. Reviewed in this number.
- BERNARD BOSANQUET'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE. By *Bertil Pfannenstill*. C. W. K. Gleerup. Lund. Pp. 324. Paper cover.
- THE CERTAINTY OF CHRIST (Washington Cathedral Series). By *William Temple*, Archbishop of York. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee. Pp. 115. \$1.00
- CHRISTIANITY IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE. By *William Temple*. Morehouse Publishing Company, Milwaukee. Pp. 112. \$1.50.
- CONSCIOUSNESS IN NEO-REALISM. By *Binayendranath Ray*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. xv, 153. \$3.00.
- THE DHAMMAPADA. By *Irving Babbitt*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. xii, 123. \$2.00.
- THE ENCHANTED GLASS. The Elizabethan Mind in Literature. By *Hardin Craig*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. ix, 293. \$2.50.
- THE EMERGENCE OF HUMAN CULTURE. By *Carl Warden*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 189. \$2.00.
- FROM HEGEL TO MARX. By *Sidney Hook*. Reynal and Hitchcock, New York. Pp. 335. \$4.00.
- GENGHIS KHAN. By *Ralph Fox*. Harcourt Brace and Company, New York. Pp. xiii, 285. \$3.00.
- THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University, 1933. By *Arthur O. Lovejoy*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. ix, 382. \$4.00.
- GEORGE BERKELEY. A Study of his Life and Philosophy. By *John Wild*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. ix, 546. \$6.00.
- HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT. Third Revised Edition. By *Lewis H. Haney*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xx, 827. \$3.60.
- THE HERITAGE OF THE CATHEDRAL. By *Sartell Prentice*. William Morrow, New York. Pp. xxi, 328. \$3.50. Reviewed in this number.
- THE ISSUE IN LITERARY CRITICISM. By *Myron C. Brightfield*. University of California Press, Berkeley, California. Pp. xiii, 316. \$4.00. Reviewed in this number.
- DIE KRISE DES IDEALISMUS. By *Arthur Liebert*. Rascher Verlag, Zurich and Leipzig. Pp. 238. Reviewed in this number.
- LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC. By *A. J. Ayer*. Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. Pp. 254. 9/ net. Reviewed in this number.
- THE LOGIC OF WILLIAM OF OCKHAM. By *Ernest A. Moody*. Sheed and Ward, New York. Pp. xiv, 322. \$3.50.

- THE METAPHYSICS OF BERKELEY. By *Gajanan Wasudeo Kaveeshwar*. Mrs. Ashavati Kaveeshwar, Jail Road, Mandleshwar, Central India. Pp. vi, 360. 7s 6d.
- MUTTER UND KIND IM ALTBIBLISCHEN SCHRIFTTUM. By *Alexander Margolius*. Berthold Levy Verlag, Berlin. Pp. 46. Paper cover.
- THE MIGRATION OF CULTURE. By *Rendel Harris*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Pp. 60. 5s net. Reviewed in this number.
- THE NATURE OF RELIGION. By *Edward C. Moore*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. ix, 368. \$2.50.
- ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY. The Story of the Teachers of the East. By *Francis Ruth Grant*. Dial Press, New York. Pp. xi, 303. \$2.75.
- A PARSON IN REVOLT. By *Joseph McCulloch*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. xix, 174. \$1.50. Reviewed in this number.
- PHILOSOPHY OF OUR UNCERTAINTIES. By *Gustav E. Mueller*. University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma. Pp. xii, 237. \$3.00.
- THE REVIVAL OF PASCAL. By *D. M. Eastwood*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. xii, 212. \$4.50.
- THE ROMAN'S WORLD. By *Frank Gardner Moore*. Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. xiii, 502. \$3.75.
- THE RENAISSANCE. By *Franz-Funck-Brentano*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 320. \$2.50.
- SOURCES OF THE FAUST TRADITION FROM SIMON MAGUS TO LESSING. By *P. M. Palmer* and *R. P. More*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. vi, 300. \$3.50.
- SCHELLING: OF HUMAN FREEDOM. Translation with Critical Introduction and Notes by *James Gutmann*. Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. Pp. Lii, 128. \$1.50.
- THE SCIENCE OF HYPNOTISM. By *Alexander Cannon*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. 126. \$1.50. A discussion of the practice and methods of hypnotism which appears to be a strange cross between science and buncombe.
- SOME ASPECTS OF JEWISH ETHICS. By *Kenneth Carlton Zwerin*. The Church Divinity School, Berkeley, California. Pp. 20. Paper Pamphlet.
- THE UNIVERSITIES OF EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES. A New Edition in 3 Volumes. By the late *Hastings Rashdall*. Edited by *F. M. Powicke* and *A. B. Emden*. Oxford University Press, New York. Pp. Vol. I, xlv, 593; Vol. II, ix, 342; Vol. III, xxvi, 558. \$21.00.
- WHAT'S THE NAME, PLEASE? By *Charles Earle Funk*. Funk and Wagnall's Company, New York. Pp. vii, 176. If you have had difficulty with the correct pronunciation of contemporary names here is an authoritative index to the names most heard in American life.

- THE THEORY OF LOGIC. By *A. P. Ushenko*. Harper Brothers, New York. Pp. xii, 197. \$1.50. Reviewed in this number.
- THE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS. By *Charles A. Beard*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. vii, 124. \$1.75.
- ON THE RIM OF THE ABYSS. By *James T. Shotwell*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. xiv, 400. \$3.00.
- TRANSSUBJECTIVITY OF SENSE-QUALITIES. By *N. Lossky*. Université Libre Russe, Prague II. Pp. 34. Paper cover.
- TOMORROW'S UNCONVENTIONAL ETHICS. By *Osias L. Schwarz*. Perennial Publications, Washington. Pp. 276. \$3.50. One would expect from the title something radical and suggestive. The book seems to have been written to dismiss Christian Ethics in order that the Christian Ethics of the author might be substituted instead.
- CHRONOLOGY OF BOOKS AND PRINTING. By *David Greenwood* and *Helen Gentry*. The Macmillan Company, New York. Pp. 186. \$2.00. For the collector or bibliographical student but also for the person of intelligence this book will be a source of invaluable information and continuing interest. There seems to be no angle in the history of printing at which it does not carry the desired enlightenment.
- A SEARCH IN SECRET EGYPT. By *Paul Brunton*. E. P. Dutton and Company, New York. Pp. 287. \$3.50. This is the kind of book that will thrill the lover of dark, occult or impenetrable secrets. At the same time it carries a considerable amount of information regarding both ancient and modern practices of magic.